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I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Periodically in the history of the West there have occurred
revolutionary changes in the predominant system of beliefs held by
the people of a given country or countries. Thus in the early sixteenth
century the rise of Protestantism, especially in its Lutheran form,
reflected a major shift in the belief system of most persons-not only
of Protestants -living in the numerous polities that then made up the
German Empire. Some four generations later, in the mid-seventeenth
century, various Calvinist and neo-Calvinist beliefs became predominant in English social life, espoused not only by Puritans and other
so-called Non-Conformists but also by many who remained loyal to
Anglicanism. And then in the late eighteenth century Deism became
strong, especially in France, and a new outlook came to prevail, called
the Enlightenment, which was essentially individualistic and
rationalistic; this outlook found expression in the French Revolution
of 1789.
These shifts in religious outlook-from Lutheranism to neoCalvinism to Enlightened Deism-were accompanied by parallel shifts
*
This article reproduces, with some revisions and the addition of footnotes, the Edward A. Seegers Lectures delivered November 8, 9, and 10, 1983, at
Valparaiso University Law School. Parts of the lectures were drawn directly from
H.J. Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the West: An Historical Perspective, 1
J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 3 (1983). Both that article and this one reflect the provisional
conclusions of work in progress. I am indebted to John Witte, Jr., for assistance and
criticism. © Harold J. Berman
**
James Barr Ames Professor of Law, Harvard Law School
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in the dominant political and constitutional outlook. Sixteenth-century
German Lutheranism was associated with a new belief in the
supremacy of the Prince, with his courtiers and civil servants.
Seventeenth-century English Puritanism and Anglicanism were
associated with a new belief in the supremacy of an essentially
aristocratic Parliament over the Crown and the Church, and in the
independence of the judiciary. Eighteenth-century French Deism and
the Enlightenment were associated with a new belief in democracy
and the rule of public opinion through a popularly elected legislature.
The interconnections between religious change and politicalconstitutional change in these three periods of European history have
been explored in many books, and in that context certain changes
in legal philosophy have also been discussed. Strangely, however, no
one, so far as I know, has attempted to relate the changes in the
legal system as a whole in any of the three periods-that is, the German legal system in the sixteenth century, the English legal system
in the seventeenth century, and the French legal system in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries-to the revolutionary
changes that took place in the belief system. We have many studies
of the relationship of German Protestantism, of English Puritanism,
and of the French Enlightenment to political developments, to
economic developments, to social developments, to the development
of scientific thought-to virtually everything except the development
of the characteristic legal institutions by which these nations were
governed: judicial procedure, criminal law, contracts, property,
business associations, family law, and the like.
But even apart from the paucity of such historical studies, our
scholarship is woefully weak in discerning contemporary relationships
between the legal institutions of a society and that society's underlying system of ideas, ideals, or beliefs. We gladly reach out for an
explanation of legal institutions in terms of the economic or political
or social "interests" or "policies" that they support. But we are considerably less interested in identifying what Roscoe Pound once called
"jural postulates" - the specific philosophical or moral assumptions implicit in specific legal institutions -and in relating those jural
postulates to other postulates upon which our social order rests.
Our predilection for political, economic, and social explanations
of legal development, and our corresponding aversion to philosophical
and religious explanations, seem to me to reflect a relatively narrow
concept of law as a mere device or instrument by which powerful
persons or groups may advance their political or economic or social
objectives. Even if this narrow concept of law is assumed to be corhttps://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1
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rect so far as it goes, it does not go far enough to be satisfying for
it ignores the fact that virtually every law-making regime in the
history of mankind has wanted its laws not only to advance its interests but also to reflect its ideas of rightness and of justice. Indeed, if we look to those regimes of recent history in which law was
most openly subordinated to the ulterior political-economic-social ends
of dictatorial power, namely, those of Hitler and Stalin, then we see
immediately that even the legal systems instituted by these two
tyrants strongly reflected their respective philosophies -indeed, their
religions, for both Stalin's atheist socialism and Hitler's pagan racism
were themselves, in an important sense, religions.
If Communist law reflects a Communist belief system, then surely
it is at least plausible to suppose that the legal institutions introduced
by the Lutheran princes of German territories in the sixteenth century reflected a Lutheran belief system; that the legal institutions
introduced by the Puritan rulers of England in the 1640's and 1650's,
and those that were later reaffirmed by their Anglican successors of
the 1660's to 1690's, reflected Puritan and Anglican belief systems;
and that the legal changes introduced in France after the French
Revolution reflected the values, the postulates, the beliefs of the
Enlightenment.
It should be emphasized that I am not now talking about
"causation." I am not arguing that legal changes are caused by
religious or ideological changes. I am talking rather about interconnections, interrelationships, whether or not causal. To take an example: the Puritan emphasis on the moral sanctity of an undertaking
may or may not have been a "cause" of the development of the English
doctrine of strict liability for breach of contract-a doctrine first clearly laid down in the case of Paradine and Jane, decided by the Court
of King's Bench in 1648, at the height of the Puritan Revolution; but
the interconnections between the religious postulate and the legal
postulate need to be understood if either one is to be understood.
Yet one can read the entire scholarly literature on the history
of Germany, England, and France in the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries without finding more than oblique references to such interconnections between legal institutions and fundamental beliefs.
This, then, is the first argument of these lectures, and, indeed
the main point. It is a simple one, which I hope that even skeptics
of my larger historical perspective would accept: that the new law
that emerged in Germany at the time of the Protestant Reformation
must be studied in connection with the beliefs to which the Protestant Reformers were committed, including not only their theology in
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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the narrow sense but also their social theories; similarly, that the
new law that emerged in England as a result of the upheavals of 1640
to 1689 must be seen in the light of changes in belief that took place
during that period, including not only religious belief but also political
belief, scientific belief, and other aspects of the belief system; and
finally, that the new law that emerged in France-and also in
America-in the last years of the eighteenth and the early part of
the nineteenth centuries must be understood as part of a shift in the
entire system of beliefs that took place in the West at that time.
Why should legal history be viewed in this way? The answer
is, once again, elementary: such a view, by helping us to understand
the beliefs with which our legal institutions have been associated in
the past, will help us also to anticipate the consequences of the decline
of those beliefs for the development of law in the future. For at the
end of the twentieth century we live once again in the wake of revolutionary upheavals and revolutionary changes both in our legal system
and in our general system of beliefs. If we do not understand the
close relationship between our legal system and our belief system,
we will be unable, in my view, to change either the one or the other
to meet the needs that confront us.
II.

THE LUTHERAN REFORMATION AND GERMAN LAW

The Religious Reformation
The fifteenth century was something like the twentieth: then,
as now, the West lived, in Matthew Arnold's famous phrase, "between
twu worlds, one dead, the other powerless to be born." Then there
was widespread clamor for a thoroughgoing reformation both of the
church and of the secular order. In the early part of the century the
religious revolt of the Hussites was put down, and the conciliar movement within the church was aborted. In the latter decades the campaign by the Northern humanists- Erasmus is the most famous name
among them-for more civilized, more humane ecclesiastical policies
met with only a weak response from the papal hierarchy, which by
that time had sunk into the deepest corruption.
The demand for reformation extended also to the secular realm.
As early as 1438, the German Emperor Sigismund himself proposed
thoroughgoing secular changes, which he expressly called a "Reformation." Little came of it. The depressed peasant masses revolted
sporadically without success. There was great poverty and unrest in
the German cities as well, and many unsuccessful proposals for urban
"reformations." The cities, in turn, put great economic and social
pressure on the depressed knightly class, which itself eventually rose
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1
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up in revolt-again, without success.
Throughout Europe the central political authority was increasing its power, especially vis-A-vis the church and the feudal
authorities. The growth of national political consciousness in the fifteenth century was reflected especially in the strengthening of royal
power in England, France, Spain, Austria, and the German principalities. Secular authority was also becoming stronger in the cities.
Everywhere the church was increasingly on the defensive.'
In hindsight we can see that things were building up for an
explosion. This was also recognized by many at the time, and many
important changes were made in order to forestall such an explosion.
None of them, however, prior to Luther, addressed the crucial problem of the times, namely, in Myron Gilmore's words, that "the Gregorian Revolution had finally failed." "The idea that secular government
was directed ultimately to the attainment of grace or justice," Gilmore
writes, "[was] no longer taken seriously."2 In other words, the secular
world could no longer derive its ultimate meaning from the tasks set
for it by the Church of Rome. And there was no other Church!
The Gregorian Revolution of the late eleventh and early twelfth
centuries had expressed itself in a revision of the ancient "two swords"
theory. As revised by Pope Gregory VII and his successors, the theory
postulated that the Church, conceived now as the priesthood, operating
under the papal monarchy, had jurisdiction, that is, lawmaking power,
over the spiritual life of Christendom. That was the "spiritual sword."
It was limited, to be sure, by the "secular sword" wielded by kings,
feudal lords, urban authorities, and others. Yet ultimately, the spiritual
sword of the Church was to guide the secular authorities into the
paths of truth and righteousness. It was the visible Church, under
the papacy, that set the rules for leading the good life by which sinful man could be saved. Implicit in this division of jurisdictions was
the doctrine that the forgiveness of sins and the salvation of souls
rested not only on the faith of the sinner but also on his good deeds,
and that the performance of good deeds depended, in turn, partly on
his will and reason.
1.

G.

STRAUSS, MANIFESTATIONS OF DISCONTENT IN GERMANY ON THE EVE OF THE

52-63, 130-38, 142-44, 196-207 (1971).
2. M. GILMORE, THE WORLD OF HUMANISM 135 (1952). Gilmore adds: "Given that
problem, the thinkers of the age occupied themselves with finding a new justification
and meaning for the secular world. This is the theme that not only unites Luther,
More and Machiavelli, but it is also the theme that gives their writing its 'modern'
tone." Id. On the Papal ("Gregorian") Revolution, see H.J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUREFORMATION

TION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION,
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Luther started a revolution by addressing the question of ecclesiastical authority directly and in the most radical terms. He proclaimed the abolition of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction. This was the
underlying significance of his 95 theses denouncing papal indulgences
in 1517: it was not merely that he was against abuses of papal
authority-it was that he denied the validity of the canon law
altogether. No priest, he said, is authorized to come between God and
the individual human soul that seeks forgiveness for sins. Therefore
no priest can promulgate the laws by which Christians should live.
The Church, Luther said, has no authority to declare laws at all. It
is not a lawmaking institution. The Church is, rather, the invisible
community of all believers in which all are priests, serving each other,
and each is a "private person" in his relation to God. Each responds
to the Bible as the Word of God.'
In testimony to his abolition of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, Luther
in 1521 publicly burned the Papal Bull which excommunicated him,
together with canon law books supporting the Bull. The Emperor of
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland ("the Holy Roman Empire of the
German Nation"), supported by the Imperial diet (Reichstag), outlawed
Luther; however, his own prince protected him and in 1529 the
Lutheran princes and city representatives "protested" the Imperial
decrees, and civil war broke out. (It is from this protest that the name
"Protestant" is derived.) The princes formed a religious party, the
Protestant League, which in 1552, with the help of France, defeated
the Emperor. Finally, in 1555, at Augsburg, a religious peace was
made, whereby each of the various principalities of the Empire was
empowered to establish its own form of religion, either Catholic or
Protestant. The religion chosen by the prince was to be the religion
of all people in the territory which he ruled-cuius regio eius religio,
"he who rules shall establish his religion."'
Luther replaced the Gregorian "two swords" theory with a new
"two kingdoms" theory. The Church, he taught, belongs to the heavenly kingdom of grace and faith; it is governed by the Gospel. The
3. For discussion of Luther's conceptions of politics and law see F. EDWARD
CRANZ, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LUTHER'S THOUGHTS ON JUSTICE, LAW, AND
SOCIETY (1959); K. HERTZ, TWO KINGDOMS AND ONE WORLD (1976); A. LANG, THE REFORMATION AND NATURAL LAW IN CALVIN AND THE REFORMATION 63 ff. (1959); WILLIAM MUELLER,
CHURCH AND STATE IN LUTHER AND CALVIN 1-59 (1954); J. TONKIN, THE CHURCH AND THE
SECULAR ORDER 37-72 (1971); Q. SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT, If, 3-20, 81-112 (1978). Many of Luther's writings to which this discussion refers
are found in J. DILLENBERGER, MARTIN LUTHER: SELECTIONS FROM HIS WRITINGS (1961).
4. The political history of the Reformation in Germany is well told in 1 H.
HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY, THE REFORMATION (1959) and in many other
works.
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earthly kingdom, the kingdom of "this world," is the kingdom of sin
and death; it is governed by Law. It is the secular authority alone
which governs the secular society.
Luther withdrew from the church its character as a swordwielding entity-a visible, corporate, hierarchical, political and legal
community. Instead, the church was to be a purely spiritual
community, part of the heavenly realm of peace, joy, grace, salvation,
and glory. This concept of the church was based on the pivotal doctrine of justification by faith. Luther denied that a person could work
his way, so to speak, into the heavenly kingdom. Nothing that a person does can "save" him, that is, can make him acceptable to God.
Man's fallen nature, his depravity, his essential selfishness, penetrates
everything he does-indeed everything he thinks and everything he
wants. Therefore salvation is only by grace, which is only bestowed
on those who have faith. For this, no mediation by a priesthood is
needed, or possible.
But what about the earthly kingdom? Superficially understood,
Luther's doctrine seems to take an entirely negative view of it. It
is a realm of sin and death, and there is no way out of it by exercise
of will or reason. Politics and law are not a path to grace and faith.
But are not grace and faith a path to the right politics and the right
law?
Here Luther was torn between his belief in man's essential
wickedness and his belief that that wickedness itself, and the earthly
realm which embodies it, are ordained by God. This dilemma is resolved in part by the doctrine of "the uses of the law." The moral
law as well as the law of civil society are ordained, first, in order
to make people conscious of their obligations and hence repentant of
their sins (the "theological use" of the law), and second, in order to
deter recalcitrant people from misconduct by threat of penalties (the
"civil use" of the law). Some Lutherans, at least, and most Calvinists,
also accepted a third use of the law, called its "didactic" or
"pedagogical" use, namely, to guide faithful people in the paths of
virtuous living.
Even more important, however, than the doctrine of the uses
of the law in explaining Luther's view' of the earthly realm was his
assumption that its ruler would himself be a Christian and would treat
his princely responsibilities as a Christian calling. As the Christian
prince, according to Luther, is a private person in his relation with
God, "a person for himself alone," so he is a social person, a "person
for the sake of others," in his calling as a prince. As such, he should
be inspired to serve his people. He should seek to govern in a decent
and godly way. He should strive to promote the well-being of his subProduced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1984
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jects. The Lutheran prince was essentially different from the prince
of Niccol6 Machiavelli, Luther's contemporary. Machiavelli also
believed in the secular state, removed from the divine law, but
Machiavelli's prince was to act solely from considerations of power
politics, whereas Luther's prince was to strive also to do justice. In
this respect, secular politics and law in Protestant principalities continued the older Roman Catholic tradition, though from a different
theological and philosophical perspective. The older tradition taught
that law is based ultimately on reason and on man's natural inclination toward justice, and that human law, to be valid, must ultimately
reflect natural law and divine law. Lutheranism taught, on the contrary, that man's reason and man's will are essentially corrupt, and
that human law cannot help but partake of this corruption. Nevertheless, Lutheranism also taught that the Christian lawmaker can and
should do his utmost to use his reason and his will to serve God.
This was required both by Scripture and by natural law-"the law
written in the hearts of men" (Romans 1:18). Further, it was the task
of the Christian pastor to preach the Gospel to the prince in order
to inspire him to fulfill his calling. Indeed, Luther expanded the concept of "calling," which previously had been applied solely to the
clergy, to include the mission of every person to perform his social
role in a manner pleasing to God.
Thus the connection between law and religion was preserved by
the Lutheran doctrine of the Two Kingdoms, coupled with the concept of the Christian calling. Politics and law were not paths to grace
and faith, but grace and faith remained paths to right politics and
right law. The Christian was supposed to be law-abiding, and the law
of a Christian prince was supposed to achieve both order and justice.
Law was supposed to induce people to avoid evil, to cooperate, and
to serve the community. The Christian was not to think that by doing
good he could earn credits in heaven; nevertheless, he was to use
his will and reason-with full consciousness of their defective natureto do as much good as possible.
And so, ultimately, Luther took a positive view of secular law.
More important, the Protestant Reformation which he inaugurated
made substantial contributions to the development of law in Germany
and elsewhere. In the words of the great German jurists and historian
Rudolph Sohm, "Luther's Reformation was a renewal not only of faith
but also of the world: both the world of spiritual life and the world
of law." 5
5.

R.

SOHM, WELTLICHES UND GEISTLICHES RECHT
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By "the secular authority," Luther meant, above all, the prince;
and it was the alliance of Luther with the prince of his own territory,
Saxony, and eventually the alliance of Lutherans with other princes,
that secured the victory of Protestantism in the territories inhabited
by a majority of the people of the German Empire. It was this alliance
and this victory which I would call "the German Revolution." Each
prince became head of the church in his principality. Not only did
his choice of religion determine the established religion of the principality, under the doctrine cuius regio eius religio, but the Protestant prince exercised legislative, administrative, and judicial powers
over the temporal affairs of the church in his territory. Lutheranism
thus strengthened the authority of the prince-not only in Germany
but also in other parts of Europe to which it penetrated.
Moreover, Lutheran support for the authority of the prince was
not merely a matter of political strategy. It was a matter of theology
as well. Luther found in Scripture and in Christian faith the source
of royal power. Under the Fourth Commandment, he said, the citizen
owes the same duty of obedience to the prince that the child owes
to a father, the wife to a husband, or the individual to God. "The
powers that be," in St. Paul's words, "are ordained by God" (Romans
13:11).
The Legal Reformation
I have given the very briefest account of some familiar features
of Lutheran religious thought and of their significance for political
and legal theory. I would like now to give the very briefest account
of some basic changes in German law that took place in Luther's
lifetime. My hope is to lay a foundation for some concluding remarks
on the interconnections between these two reformations -the reform
of religion and the reform of law in Germany.
Germany in 1500 formed an Empire, called the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The German Emperor might rule territories outside of Germany as well, depending to a certain extent
on his marital connections. But even the German part of the Empire
was a very loose and a very weak structure. Within it there were
an incredibly large number of principalities -some 350 all told. These
ranged from very large territories (Ldnder), such as Saxony, Bohemia,
Bavaria, Swabia, and others, some of which were sizeable kingdoms,
to small counties and towns, and from large archbishoprics to small
abbeys (some 120 of the principalities were ecclesiastical). In previous
centuries the emperor had had very little control over the law by
which the constituent principalities were governed. In 1495 Emperor
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Maximilian finally succeeded in establishing a permanent imperial high
court to hear some important cases, and in 1532 Emperor Charles
V issued the first important modern imperial legislation, a code of
criminal law and procedure. Even then, the principalities had a decisive
voice in determining whether to be bound by that code.
Nineteenth and twentieth century German historians have complained bitterly about the fragmentation of Germany; they have envied France and England, which had already achieved a higher degree
of national political unity in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.'
Yet the absence of strong political and legal institutions at the imperial level did not necessarily signify disunity. In fact, there had
developed in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries in Germany a very
strong "common law" on several levels. In the first place, the law
applied in the German ecclesiastical courts was the jus canonicum,
or canon law, common to the whole of Western Europe. For the
peoples of Germany, as for all other peoples of Western Christendom, bishops' courts applied the learned law taught in virtually all
the European universities, consisting partly of papal and conciliar
legislation and papal court decisions (decretals), partly of Gratian's
Decretum and other great treatises, and partly also of Roman law as
reflected in the texts of Justinian that had been rediscovered in Italy
in the late eleventh century and had been glossed, commented on,
and systematized by many generations of scholars. Both canon law
and Roman law were called jus commune, "common law."'
In addition to canon law, with its Roman law component, Germany was governed, secondly, by a common customary law, including
a common customary local law and a common customary feudal law;
this was systematized in the Sachsenspiegel of 1220 and in other
private German lawbooks which in fact had a quasi-official validity
everywhere. Thirdly, many hundreds of German cities had adopted
the collections of laws and had followed the court decisions of several
leading cities, which, in turn, had many features in common. Finally,
the Ldnder, in developing their own judicial and other legal institutions, borrowed extensively from each other.8 The widespread notion,
6. Rudolph Huebner, for example, characterizes the German law of the Reformation period and before as "much disintegrated and lacking in unity," "particularistic,"
"disjointed," "parochial," due in part to the multiple sources of law and the lack of
an integrated court system and an integrated legal science. R. HUEBNER, A HISTORY
OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW

1-40 (1918). From a similar perspective one might say the same

about American law in the nineteenth century or perhaps even today.
7: See H.J. BERMAN, supra note 2, at 199-254.
8. Id. at 371-80, 482-511.
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then, that in comparison with other European countries, preReformation Germany was fragmented in its legal development and
backward in legal sophistication needs to be substantially revised.
On the other hand, the legal institutions of pre-Reformation Germany were indeed in great need of reform. The reasons were manifold;
let me give two. First, there was an enormous problem of crime,
especially on the highways. Huge numbers of wanderers -unemployed
vagabonds, robbers, gypsies, ex-monks, ex-students, and others-were
at large. The traditional local criminal law, based as it was on more
stable conditions, was not adequate to deal effectively with widespread
and mobile crime of a quasi-professional character. Second, the
ecclesiastical courts, which had had an extremely broad civil and
criminal jurisdiction in Germany, even broader, it is usually said, than
in England, were losing substantial parts of that jurisdiction, especially
to city and princely courts, whose procedures and norms were, once
again, not well adapted to the increased number and variety of cases.
Here it is necessary to say more about the nature of the German secular courts in the period before the Reformation. For centuries there had existed in Germany, at the city and territorial level
as well as at the imperial level, a tradition and a system of judging
by tribunals composed of a number of prominent laymen, called Schoeffen ("assessors"), who sat with an official called a Richter ("director").
The word Richter, of course, now means "judge," but prior to the
Reformation period, the Schoeffen were the Urteiler, the "judges"they gave "judgment." This tradition and this system was fundamental to the development of German secular law in the twelfth to fifteenth centuries. The chief source of that law was custom, and the
Schoeffen, being responsible, intelligent, educated (though not
university-trained) leaders in the community, knew the custom or else
were capable of finding it out. The fact that a substantial part of the
customary law came to be expressed in written treatises, such as the
Sachsenspiegel, or in written collections of city laws, did not change
its character; it was presupposed in the written texts themselves that
the law contained therein remained customary law, to be found and
developed by benches of amateur, part-time Schoeffen sitting under
the direction of an official Richter.
It was this tradition and this system which came under challenge
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Eventually it gave
way, first, to a system of tribunals consisting entirely of professional
university-trained judges -officials educated in the kind of learned
law that hitherto in Germany had been practiced only in the ecclesiastical courts; and second, to a tradition of law whose principal
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source was not custom but rather legislation- not, to be sure, legislation in the contemporary sense, but legislation in the sense of a system
of written rules contained in authoritative texts.
This change, which a distinguished German legal historian refers
to as the Verwissenschaftlichung of German law'-literally, the "scientificizing," the rationalizing and systematizing of it as a body of
authoritative rules-did not, of course, come all at once. At first, important learned officials were named by the territorial princes to
preside at the trials as Richter; eventually, the princes began to choose
trained jurists to be Schoeffen; finally, the courts became wholly professional and the Schoeffen more or less disappeared.
Moreover, the "scientific" element in law-perhaps we should
call it the "intellectual" element-was given its ultimate expression
in the practice, which first became widespread in the sixteenth century, of submitting the most difficult cases to law professors, that
is, to university law faculties, for decision.
Courts of territories and of cities as well as the Imperial High
Court itself, when faced with a particularly difficult application of the
law, were supposed to send the entire file of the case to a law faculty,
and the law professors would study and discuss the case and render
a reasoned judgment binding upon the court. Called Aktenversendung,
"the sending of the file," this institution, which lasted in Germany
until 1878, was not only highly lucrative for the professors; it also
had an enormous influence on the substance as well as on the style
of German law. 10 It reflected and embodied an emphasis-new for the
German secular courts-on written (instead of oral) procedure, on
secrecy (instead of publicity) of proceedings, and on separation of issues
of fact (on which findings below were final) from issues of law (on
which errors below were subject to appeal). Even more fundamental
was the shift from the concept that the court was to find the law,
and thereby "set right what was wrong," to the concept that the court

9.

F. WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 131 ff. (1967). Another

prominent German historian defines the legal reformation of this period as the "gelehrte
Bearbeitungen des einheimischen Rechts." H. HATTENHAUER and A. BUSCHMANN, TEXTBUCH DER PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT 11 (1967).
10.

Cf. E. ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY,

OUT OF REVOLUTION: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF

WESTERN MAN 402-03 (1938). A vivid account of the institution of Aktenversendungen is
found in J.P. DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 198-213, 240-41 (1968). A precursor of
the sixteenth century German development is to be found in the practice of courts
in various parts of Europe to consult individual learned jurists about difficult cases.
This practice became formalized in some Italian cities in the fourteenth century. Cf.
G. KIRSCH, CONSILIA: EINE BIBLIOGRAPHIE DER JURISTISCHEN KONSILIENSAMMLUNGEN (1970).
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was to apply the law, that is, bring the case before it under the appropriate rule "by a process of logical subsumption. '' The latter intellectual process necessarily involved a new kind of systematization
of legal rules.
We may understand better the significance of the "scientificization" of German law in the last years of the fifteenth and the first
half of the sixteenth century if we examine its connection with the
reform of criminal law and procedure.12 I have already mentioned that
there was an enormous increase in violent crime in the late fifteenth
century. Governmental authorities reacted by harsh measures of law
enforcement. This, in turn, produced its own reaction. In 1497-1498
the Imperial Reichstag of Freiburg resolved: "Because complaints have
been brought to [the imperial] court against princes, imperial cities,
and other authorities, that they have allowed innocent people to be
condemned to death and executed unlawfully and without sufficient
cause . . . it is therefore necessary to undertake a general reforma-

F. WIEACKER, supra note 9, at 188.
12. Legal "reformations" preceded or accompanied religious "reformations"
in major cities, including Niurnberg (1479), Worms (c. 1499), Frankfurt (1509, 1578), and
Freiburg (1520). For a general survey of the city reformations, see B. MOELLER, IMPERIAL CITIES AND THE REFORMATION (1972) and S. OPMENT, THE REFORMATION AND THE
CITIES (1972). For detailed studies of the legal reformations in individual cities, see for
Nirnberg, J.W. ELLINGER, DIE JURISTEN DER REICHSSTADT NURNBERG VOM 15. BIS 17.
JAHRHUNDERT (1954); A. GEDEON, ZUR REZEPTION DES ROMISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS IN
11.

NORNBERG

(1957); F.

WINTER, BEITRAGE UND ERLAUTERUNGEN ZU GESCHICHTE UND RECHT

(1903); D. WALDMANN, ENTSTEHUNG DER NURNBERGER
1479 (1908). For Worms, see C. KOEHNE, DIE WORMSER REFORMATION
1499 (1897); id., Der Ursprung der Stadtverfassung in Worms, Speier, und

DER NURNBERGER REFORMATION
REFORMATION VON
VOM JAHRE

Mainz,

in

OTTO

RECHTSGESCHICHTE

VON

GIERKE,

UNTERSUCHUNGEN

(1890). For Frankfurt, see H.

ZUR

DEUTSCHEN

STAAT-UND

COING, DIE FRANKFURTER REFORMATION

1578 (1935); id., DIE REZEPTION DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS IN FRANKFURT AM MAIN (1939,
1962). For Freiburg, see H. KNOCHE, ULRICH ZASIUS UND DAS FREIBURGER STADTRECHT
VON 1520 (1957). A collection of city codes of this period may be found in W. KUNKEL ET
AL., QUELLEN ZUR NEUEREN PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DEUTSCHLANDS 1 (1936).
Apart from city reformations, the Polizeiordnungen, promulgated first by the
Empire and later by the Lander, became new sources of private law. Although Stobbe
had emphasized their significance as early as 1860, later scholars subordinated them
to what they called "the Reception of Roman Law" of the late fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries. More recent scholarship has placed that "Reception" much earlier
and has revived interest in the Polizeiordnungen. See 0. VON STOBBE, GESCHICHTE DER
VON

DEUTSCHEN RECHTSQUELLEN
PRIVATRECHTS,

I-V (1864); W.

II, 200, 220, 229 ff. (1860); id.,

HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN

TRUSEN, ANFANGE DES GELEHRTEN RECHTS IN DEUTSCHLAND

(1962). The best survey of the Polizeiordnungen is G.K.
NUNGEN
UND
PRIVATRECHTS
(1955).
PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DEUTSCHLANDS

ordinances.
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II (1968), includes many of the original
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tion and ordering in the Empire of the mode of proceeding in criminal
matters." '
In light of our situation today, we can appreciate the poignancy
of the conflict that raged in Germany at the end of the fifteenth and
the beginning of the sixteenth century between adherents of what
we would now call the "crime control" and the "due process" "models"
of criminal procedure. We can also admire their resolutions of this
conflict.
The great name, the great man, in criminal law reform was
Johann von Schwarzenberg." He was born twenty years before Luther
in a noble family in the episcopal principality of Bamberg. He eventually became the chief official (Hofmeister) of Bamberg, under the
bishop, and sat as chief judge of the Bamberg high court. He was
a man of great intelligence and dedication, a deeply religious person,
very widely read, a folk-poet, with many learned friends, though he
himself had not had a university training and did not know Latin.
In 1507, when Schwarzenberg was in his early forties, he produced
for Bamberg a code of criminal law and procedure that acquired almost
instant fame throughout Germany. Other principalities copied it. The
Emperor Charles V eventually employed Schwarzenberg to rework
his code for adoption by the Empire and in 1532, a few years after
Schwarzenberg's death, the imperial code, called the Constitutio
Criminalis Carolina,or Carolina for short, closely modelled on the
Bamberg code, was in fact adopted.",
Quoted in J. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE 155 (1974).
A short biography and appreciation of Schwarzenberg is given in E.
WOLF, GROSSE RECHTSDENKER DER DEUTSCHEN GEISTESGESCHICHTE 92-128 (1963). The emphasis placed here on Schwarzenberg is not intended to exclude the importance of
other great German jurists of the time, notably the famous Ulrich Zasius, an inspired
scholar of Roman, canon, and civil law, a friend of Erasmus, an admirer and associate
of Luther, and author of the Freiburg legal reformation of 1520. Zasius is sometimes
said to be the jurist who best synthesized the Lutheran Reformation and the new
humanism of Erasmus in their application to law. See WOLF, 55-92; id.; QUELLENBUCH
ZUR GESCHICHTE DER DEUTSCHEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 7-48 (1949); R. STINTZING. ULRICH
13.
14.

ZASIUS: EIN BEITRAG ZUR GESCHICHTE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT IM ZEITALTER DER REFORMATION (1857); KNOCHE, supra note 11; R. SCHMIDT. ZASIUS UND SEINE STELLUNG IN DER
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1904); G. KISCH. ZASIUS UND REUCHLIN (1961); id., ERASMUS UND DIE
JURISPRUDENZ SEINER ZEIT 317-43 (1960). Recently Steven W. Rowan has emphasized the
theological and humanistic contributions of Zasius. See, e.g., S. ROWAN, Ulrich Zasius
and the Baptism of Jewish Children, 6 SIXTEENTH CENTURY JOURNAL 3 (1975) and U.
ZASIUS. DEATH PENALTY FOR ANABAPTISTS IN BIBLIOTHEQUE D'HUMANISME ET RENAISSANCE

527 (1979).
15. With the creation of the Reichskammergericht in 1495 came a movement
to systematize an imperial criminal law that would be valid throughout the Empire.
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Schwarzenberg's code was the first of its kind in history -that
is, the first systematic codification of a single branch of law. There
had been, to be sure, in the previous three centuries, systematic
treatises on particular branches of law, including criminal law and
procedure, written by canonist and Romanist legal scholars; and
Schwarzenberg drew heavily on concepts and definitions contained
in some of those treatises. Yet those treatises, though often treated
by European courts as authoritative, were not legislation; they were
not the same as comprehensive statutes promulgated by the legislative
power of the state. Such comprehensive statutes on particular
branches of law began to be promulgated in various German cities
in the last decade of the 15th century. Schwarzenberg built on that
practice. His genius was not that of a scholar but that of a judge,
an administrator, and, ultimately, a legislator. Erik Wolf has called
him "the great German legislator of the Reformation period.""6
The starting-point of Schwarzenberg's Bamberg code of
1507-and hence of the Carolina as well-was the existing secular
law of Bamberg as reflected in contemporary judicial practice. To this
were added basic rules of the common law, as it was called, generally
recognized throughout the Empire, which in turn were influenced by
the categories of canon law, and to a certain extent Roman law,
especially with regard to definitions of types of offenses. A third element was the conceptual framework that had been developed since
the end of the thirteenth century by outstanding European canonists
and Romanists, especially the Italians Durantis, Gandinus, Bartolus,
Baldus, and others. Finally, the whole was permeated with a spirit
of reform, and in this connection Schwarzenberg drew not only on
the Bamberg court reform of 1503, of which he himself had been the
chief author, but also on the so-called reformations of city law in
Niirnberg, in Worms, and elsewhere. His own chief personal contribution, as Wolf has said, was synthesis, based on the two fundamental
principles of "justice and the common weal" (Gerechtigkeit und
Gemeinnutz)."7
Of critical importance was the combination of systematic legal
science with a procedure still characterized by lay participation. The

The attempts to introduce a systematic criminal statute (constitutio) at the imperial
diets of 1521 and 1530 foundered on territorial and city opposition. See G. KRODEL,
Law, Order, and the Almighty Taler: The Empire in Action at the 1530 Diet of Augsburg,

12

SIXTEENTH CENTURY JOURNAL

75-106 (1982). The Carolinaremained subject to varia-

tion in the individual polities within the Empire.
16. WOLF, Grosse Rechtsdenker, supra note 14 at 96 ff., 109 ff.
17. Id. at 109. Cf. Carolina, art. 104.
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code was to govern the Schoeffen; therefore, it had to be understandable to them; and for that purpose Schwarzenberg wrote it in clear,
strong German. Three hundred years later-in 1814-the great German jurist Savigny was to say that no German legislation of the eighteenth century could compare with the Carolina in seriousness and
strength.
Incidentally, Schwarzenberg scattered little poems-rhymed
couplets-through the various sections of his code, in order to
dramatize the meaning of the rules and to make it easier to remember
them. He also inserted many handsome woodcuts, with similar effect.
The purpose of codifying the criminal law was not to make the
Schoeffen into learned jurists. Nor was the purpose to import a foreign
law. The purpose was, rather, to reform the German secular law and,
in that connection, to give it the benefit of the legal science that had
developed first in the church courts and second in the scholarly
literature of the university jurists.
Some of the major changes in secular German criminal law embodied in the Bamberg code and later in the Carolinaare the following:
-Most major crimes were defined in a systematic way. Concepts
such as self-defense, complicity, and attempt were defined. Emphasis
was placed on intent, causation, and exculpating circumstances.
-Private criminal prosecutions were severely limited. Archaic
forms of private remedies, such as wergeld, were finally eliminated.
Proof by oath-helping was finally eliminated.
- The power of officials, the Obrigkeit, to initiate and carry out
criminal prosecution was enhanced, while at the same time limits on
their power were set with care. The proceedings were to take the
form of an inquest, that is, an official investigation (Inquisition), with
the judges inquiring and collecting evidence. The Schoeffen were to
operate under the supervision of officials.

-The extraordinary procedures against persons charged merely
with being socially harmful ("of evil repute") were eliminated. (These
procedures, summary and harsh, together with the vagueness of the
charges, had been a main source of complaint against unjust repression in the late fifteenth century.)
-The system of cruel punishments (including, for example, burial
alive in the case of some crimes) was alleviated to some extent.
-High standards of proof were set. For capital crimes, in addition to convincing proof of each element of the crime it was required
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1

Berman: Law and Belief in Three Revolutions
1984]

LAW AND BELIEF

that there be two eye-witnesses or else a confession reiterated voluntarily in court. In such cases, unless there were two eye-witnesses,
torture was permitted in order to extract a confession. However, such
torture could only be used if there was sufficient evidence to convict
without a confession.
-The Schoeffen were instructed repeatedly, in various contexts,
that in difficult cases they should "seek counsel" of those who are
"learned in the law"-a reference to the institution of the
Aktenversendung.
Law AND Belief in the German Reformation
I come, finally, in our consideration of the Lutheran Reformation and German law, to the word "and."
A leading contemporary Roman Catholic theologian told a friend
that he had been asked to give a talk on "Freedom and the Church."
His friend said, "Of course you know a great deal about freedom, and
you are a recognized expert on the church. But I think you will have
a lot of difficulty with the 'and'."
By focusing attention on Schwarzenberg's great reform of German criminal law-first enacted ten years before Luther's denunciation of papal indulgences-I seem to have foreclosed any argument
that the great changes in German law in the sixteenth century were
caused by the Lutheran Reformation. It is true that the Carolinawas
not enacted until fifteen years after Luther took his stand, but it was
based on Schwarzenberg's earlier work and, moreover, it was promulgated by Emperor Charles V, an archfoe of Lutheranism.
On the other hand, Schwarzenberg did become a Lutheran. Indeed, he became an ardent and prominent Lutheran, corresponded
with Luther, and wrote tracts in defense of Lutheranism. While he
was working for the Emperor to prepare the Carolina,Schwarzenberg
used his position to protect Luther and Lutherans from repression.
No doubt it is partly because the reformation of German law
began before the reformation of the church, and partly because it was
supported by many Catholics as well as by many Protestants (and
also was opposed by many in both camps), that historians have generally ignored the relationship between the two reformations, the legal
and the religious. Yet the fact that Lutheranism did not "cause" the
Carolina,in some simple post hoc-propter hoc sense of causation, does
not mean that the two may properly be viewed as independent of
each other. The biography of Johann von Schwarzenberg suggests that
the word "and" in this context has a more complex meaning.
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The complexities multiply when we add other factors to the equation: the New Humanism, the so-called Reception of Roman Law, the
increased importance of nationalism, the expansion of commerce, the
exploration of new continents, and others. I mention these only to
show some of the dimensions of the word "and," and some of the limits
of my inquiry into it here. I am focusing simply on some of the connections between the Lutheran Reformation of the church in Germany
in the early sixteenth century "and" the movement to reform German law.
There were clear political connections. Although the transfer to
territorial and city courts of matters previously within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts had started well before Luther, this
secularization- which was an important stimulus of the law reform
movement-cannot be separated from Lutheranism. It received a
tremendous impetus from the Lutheran attack on the very concept
of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. With the abolution of the ecclesiastical
courts in the Protestant principalities, the secular courts took jurisdiction over the crimes of heresy, blasphemy, sumptuousness of dress,
and other religious and moral offenses. There was a secularization
also of the canon law of marriage and divorce, wills, charitable foundations, and other civil matters previously within the ecclesiastical
jurisdiction. Secular public schools and libraries were established to
replace cathedral schools and libraries, and all universities were placed
under civil authority. Poor relief, protection of widows and orphans,
medical care, and other forms of public welfare, which previously had
been chiefly the responsibility of monastic and other ecclesiastical
charitable foundations, were now left to the secular authority and to
secular law.
Also jurisdiction over the church itself was transferred from the
ecclesiastical to the secular authority. The Protestant prince became
the head of the churches in his principality. He was now responsible
for the development of a body of secular ecclesiastical law for the
government of their temporal affairs.
Moreover, the Protestant princes, lacking a Roman Catholic
clergy trained to administer the affairs of state, developed a secular
civil service to constitute their advisors, administrators, judges,
diplomats, and other officers. The Lutheran Reformation enhanced immeasurably the authority not only of the prince but also of the prince's
official retinue, the Obrigkeit. In addition, it was a pan-German
Obrigkeit, for German civil servants could go from one prince to
another, just as the university professors could go from the university
of one principality to that of another. This extraordinary mobility of
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the civil service, which contributed to its strong sense of calling,
distinguished Germany from England and France in the period of what
is usually called absolute monarchy in Europe.18
Thus far I have stressed political connections between the
religious reformation and the legal reformation. As a political matter,
the suppression of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, which Lutherans
demanded on theological grounds, inevitably resulted in a further rapid
expansion of secular jurisdiction; and this expansion inevitably gave
the opportunity to reform the substantive secular law which was to
be applied.
There were, in addition, what might be called intellectual connections between the legal and the religious reformations. It is interesting, for example, to compare the rhetoric and style of the
Carolina with the rhetoric and style of Luther's translation of the
Bible and his commentaries on it. The Carolina-like Schwarzenberg's
Bamberg code before it-was written in clear, simple, vivid German,
to be understood by the lay judges and lesser legal officials, untrained
in law, who participated in German criminal proceedings, just as
Luther's Bible and his commentaries were written in clear simple,
vivid German, to be understood by all believers who could read them.
One may even compare Schwarzenberg's use of figures and woodcuts
with Luther's use of hymns.
The "scientific" character of the new criminal codes, and of the
legal reformation generally, also linked them with Lutheranism. Like
Lutheranism, the Carolina was intended to be comprehensive,
systematic, integrated, complete; it proceeded from interlocking basic
principles and showed their application to typical concrete situations.
The Carolinawas professors' law, just as Lutheranism was professors'
theology, an attempt to embrace and unify the entire Christian
belief-system.
The paradox of a systematic legal codification understandable
to all literate subjects, like the paradox of a systematic Biblical
theology understandable to all literate believers, was resolved by
assigning a special role to university professors. Just as especially
difficult cases involving application of the Carolina were to be sent
to university law faculties for resolution, so especially difficult
theological questions that troubled princes and pastors were to be
resolved by university professors of theology. These practices reflected
a profound trust not only in learning but also in the university, which
18. E. ROSENSTOCK-HUESSY, supra note 10, at 394-95. Rosenstock-Huessy's entire chapter on the German Reformation is filled with important insights.
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in a sense replaced the papal curia.
I have mentioned political and intellectual connections between
the legal changes and the religious changes in sixteenth-century Germany. There are even closer moral and philosophical connections. Both
Lutheranism and the Carolina-again,I use the Carolina as one
example of the overall legal reformation that took place-share a
revulsion against cruelty and arbitrariness; both place a high value
on humaneness and rationality. Yet both accept a certain amount of
cruelty as inevitable -neither is willing to proclaim its complete abolition. Luther wrote, after the peasant rebellion of 1524, that "stern,
hard civil rule is necessary in the world ....

The civil sword shall

and must be red and bloody." 9 Many other violent statements can
be found in his voluminous writings. He was a revolutionary, fighting
enemies by the most ruthless means. Yet the faith for which he fought
was one through which love was to triumph over hatred, virtue over
sin, reason over irrationality. Similarly, Schwarzenberg was a man
of piety and idealism, one of whose main purposes was to put an end
to the cruelty and arbitrariness that had infected German criminal
law and procedure in the fifteenth century. Yet the Carolina,though
it substantially limited torture, did not abolish it.2" It eliminated death
19. VON KAUFSHANDLUNG UND WUCHER, in LUTHER. WERKE, vol. XV, 302.
20. It is something of a mystery why the requirement of a confession was
retained even after it had become, in effect, a formality. John Langbein takes the
traditional view that with the abolition of the ordeals in 1215 by the Fourth Lateran
Council, so-called statutory proofs-that is, by a confession or by two eyewitnesseswere introduced because of the prevailing distrust of judicial evaluation of so-called
subjective proofs (circumstantial evidence, one eye-witness, prior statements of the
accused, etc.). Torture was then perceived to be a logical consequence of the requirement of a confession. Thus Langbein concludes that "The Roman-canon system . . .
was simply unworkable without torture." J. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF:
EUROPE AND ENGLAND IN THE ANCIEN REGIME 11 (1977). This argument neglects the point
made elsewhere by Langbein (id.
at 13) that in the realm of lesser offenses the "Romancanon" system worked quite well without the requirement of statutory proofs. Apparently there was something about capital punishment that made the usual standards
of proof inadequate to justify the imposition of the death sentence, though only persons who were quilty by ordinary standards could be required to confess. It may be
that in these circumstances unwillingness to give up the requirement of two eyewitnesses or a confession (and hence the option of torture) in capital cases was due
partly to the belief that for the good of his own soul a guilty person should be made
to confess before he is executed. It may also have been due partly to the fact that
a confession, even when extorted, could help the investigating authorities to "solve"
the crime-it could help them, for example, to track down accomplices; and that may
have seemed especially important in cases of the more serious offenses.
As Langbein shows, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries new forms of
punishment for the most serious crimes - including imprisonment, galley service,
workhouses, and banishment - developed alongside the death penalty, and to impose
these milder sentences a confession was considered unnecessary and hence torture
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by burial alive as the penalty for infanticide, but substituted death
by drowning. It did not eliminate the crime of sorcery, but it did require proof that the act of sorcery caused harm."'
In terms of legal theory, conflicts between Schwarzenberg's two
guiding principles, justice and the common weal-in other words, between humaneness and civil order-were to be reconciled by the
wisdom of the prince, whose will was the source of all earthly law.
Luther did not adopt the modern theory of legal positivism in its strict
form. He acknowledged the independent existence of moral law, or
natural law, which he identified sometimes as that which is known
to the conscience and sometimes as that which is reflected in the spirit
of the Mosaic law. He also left some room, though not much, for civil
disobedience when the ruler commands his subject to act in evil or
ungodly ways. Nevertheless, he attacked the belief that man can truly
understand the will of God by his reason or truly reflect it in his
law, and he attacked the concept of God as a God of reason and of
law. Thus the moral law, or natural law, was associated for him with
the earthly rather than the heavenly realm. These theological positions give support to the positivist view that the source of all law
is in the will of the ruler. Because Lutheran theory, in contrast to
Roman Catholic, did not consider human law to be a given, an integral
part of the objective reality of God himself, it had to put the question: What are the uses of the law? Thus Luther took an essentially
utilitarian view of law-which also is congenial to a modern positivist
jurisprudence. Moreover, like the modern positivists, he considered
the civil use of the law to be to deter misconduct by threat of
penalties.
Modern positivist jurisprudence is often attacked for its neglect
of justice as a necessary dimension of law. It should be stressed,
therefore, that the tendencies toward positivist jurisprudence in
Lutheran thought in the sixteenth century were not antagonistic, but
in fact highly congenial, to the zeal for law reform in the direction
of justice. Lutheran thought could accept philosophical propositions

could be dispensed with. Langbein concludes from this that torture had become obsolete long before it was subjected to the criticism of the philosophers of the Enlightenment and eventually abolished. Mirjan Damaska has shown, however, that the death
penalty remained applicable in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries for numerous
crimes, including magic, witchcraft, homicide, and treason, and that even in cases where
milder punishments were applicable, judges often resorted to torture to be assured
of the defendant's guilt and to extract additional information. See M. Damaska, The
Death of Legal Torture, 87 YALE L. J. 860 (1978) (a review of Langbein's book).
21. H.J. Berman, Religious Foundations of Law in the West: An Historical
Perspective, 1 J. OF LAW AND RELIGION 3, 22-24 (1983).
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that law is the will of the ruler, that it operates by imposing sanctions for violations of rules, and that justice-indeed, reason itselfis corrupted by man's total depravity. Yet German Lutherans of the
sixteenth century could not accept the Machiavellian view that makes
human selfishness the basic principle of political action for the individual Christian, be he subject or prince. They were unwilling to
abandon the earthly kingdom to its own Satanic devices. It was presupposed that the ruler would be a Christian prince.
The religious doctrine which, perhaps more than any other,
guided sixteenth century Lutheranism between the Scylla of
Machiavellian cynicism and the Charybdis of political passivity was
the doctrine of the Christian calling. I have stressed earlier that the
Gregorian Revolution had placed the responsibility to reform the
secular society primarily on the priesthood: this was part of the two
swords theory of the Roman Catholic Church in the late eleventh to
sixteenth centuries. Protestantism placed that responsibility on every
Christian, and especially on the prince and the Obrigkeit. Each was
a "private person" in his relation to God; but each had a public responsibility in his calling.
In a civilization reduced almost to despair by the failure, after
four centuries, of the Gregorian Revolution, this Lutheran vision gave
a new meaning to secular life. It was this vision that gave Germany
society the energy to renew its legal institutions. The fact that reform
had been in the air for a hundred years before Luther only enhances
the importance of his role as a catalytic agent in bringing it to fruition. But beyond that, it places the Revolution itself in a better
perspective. It was not simply Luther's Revolution. It was also
Schwarzenberg's. Indeed, it was Germany's Revolution, in which many
participated who were not Lutherans. The precise chronological timing
of their participation is not important for us. The Revolution should
be judged in terms not of chronos but of kairos: it came in the fullness
of time.
III.

THE PURITAN REVOLUTION AND ENGLISH LAW

The religious upheaval that took place in England in the seventeenth century and the transformation of English law that accompanied
it were aspects of a general political, economic, and social revolution
similar in scope to the German Reformation of a century before and
the French Revolution of a century later. These three successive
upheavals-the German, the English, and the French-were Great
Revolutions in the classical sense, with civil war, class struggle, and
apocalyptic visions of a new era; each was characterized by fundamen-
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tal changes both in the nation's political and legal systems and in its
system of beliefs and values.
The main political and constitutional events of the English
Revolution are familiar and may be re-told quickly. For more than
a hundred years the Tudors and Stuarts had ruled England as absolute monarchs-the Tudors, on the whole, quite successfully, the
Stuarts much less so. The reign of Charles I was particularly unhappy. From 1629 to 1640 he did not once call a parliament into session.
The landed gentry and merchants complained bitterly about extraordinary royal taxes used to finance unpopular wars. Religious NonConformists were persecuted; in the decade of the 1630's some 20,000
Puritans fled to Massachusetts Bay and a comparable number crossed the channel to the Netherlands; "they flew out of England," it was
said, "as out of Babylon." Royal measures were rigorously enforced
by the so-called "prerogative courts" of Star Chamber, High Commission, Admiralty, Requests, and others-courts which had been
established by the Tudor kings and which were immediately responsive to the royal will. But even the common-law judges of the more
ancient courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, with
jurisdiction chiefly over felonies and rights in land, were at the king's
mercy: he could dismiss them at will-indeed, he could easily have
them put in the Tower.
In November 1640 the King at last convened a parliament. Under
severe provocation, its leaders, mostly Puritans, seized power. A civil
war broke out between the supporters of Parliament and the supporters of the Crown. A Puritan "Commonwealth" was established.
In 1649 Charles Stuart was tried for treason and executed. But after
Oliver Cromwell's death in 1658, Puritan rule quickly collapsed. In
1660 Charles's oldest son returned to England to take the throne as
Charles II. This was called "the Restoration," but it was also a phase
of the Revolution. Finally, in 1688, when James II-brother of Charles
II- began to exercise powers similar to those exercised fifty years
earlier by his father, Charles I, Parliament forced him to abdicate
and installed a new dynasty on the throne. This was called "the
Glorious Revolution;" it ended almost fifty years of acute civil strife,
and established a system of government which survived into the twentieth century.
Henceforth it was clear that Parliament, not the king, reigned
supreme in England. The English system of political parties took its
shape. The Bill of Rights was enacted. Judges were given life tenure.
With the abolition of the prerogative courts, the common law courts
were recognized as subordinate only to Parliament. The content of
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the common law also changed, both in procedure and in substance.
There was also a new religious settlement. An Act of Toleration
gave freedom of association and worship to the Non-Conforming
churches (although not to the Catholics). Anglican theology itself changed substantially, partly under the influence of Calvinism.
That is a bare outline of some of the major political-constitutional
events of the English Revolution of 1640-1689. I propose now to
examine in somewhat more detail, first, the religious changes that
took place in that period, and second, the legal changes.
Religious Aspects of the English Revolution
Let me start with the religious side, and especially with
Puritanism.
The Puritans-they were first called that by their enemies in
the late sixteenth century-were English followers of the French
Reformer, John Calvin. In the mid-1530's, as a very young man, Calvin
had established a Protestant religious community embracing the city
of Geneva, Switzerland. He and his followers shared many of the
theological doctrines that were being proclaimed by Martin Luther
at the time. They denied the authority of the Church of Rome. They
believed in the primacy of the Bible. They accepted, though with some
modifications, the Lutheran doctrine of the two kingdoms, justification by faith alone, the fallen nature of man, predestination, the
priesthood of all believers, and the Christian calling. They put great
emphasis on the sovereignty of God and the providential character
of human history.
The Calvinist conception of the church, however, differed substantially from the Lutheran. For Luther, the church as a visible institution was to be organized territorially under the secular ruler of the
territorial polity, the prince. The prince was believed to be ordained
by God to be the ruler of the institutional affairs of the church within
his polity-not its faith and doctrine but its legal structure, its political
and economic and social activities. The church was not a lawmaking
body: church law was merely the law of the secular ruler relating
to the secular affairs of the church. Calvin and his followers, on the
other hand, viewed the church in its visible, institutional aspect as
consisting of politically independent local congregations, each with its
own elected minister and elders, each with its own legal authority.
The legal authority of the local congregation, or synod of local congregations, was to be balanced against that of the civil polity and
might even dominate the civil polity. The Calvinist churches had their
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own law, by which they regulated not only the worship and the
theological doctrine of the civil society but also its morals, including
many aspects of its political, economic, and social life. In contrast to
Luther, Calvin, who was himself trained as a lawyer, had a well
worked out philosophy of secular law.' He added, in effect, a new
Two Swords doctrine to the Lutheran Two Kingdoms doctrine.
I will not attempt to recount the dramatic spread of Calvin's
teachings through many parts of Europe in the sixteenth and early
seventeenth century, other than to say that Calvinism became a
transnational movement, but with many variations of doctrine and of
policy in different times and places. 3 Calvin's writings were known
to educated people throughout Europe. Calvinist doctrines were
studied and were taken seriously even by those who opposed themRoman Catholics, Anglicans, Lutherans, and others.
Most English Calvinists, in the century prior to 1640, did not
contest the authority of the English Crown over the church in England,
nor did they attempt to draw its followers away from the Anglican
Church. Instead, English Calvinists sought chiefly to reform the
Church of England from within. They penetrated the Anglican clergy,
from which vantage point they attacked traditional Anglican ritualism,
resisted the Book of Common Prayer, denied the hierarchical authority
of the episcopacy, and preached the right and duty of every believer
to read and interpret Scripture for himself. Needless to say, they were,
from an early time, a thorn-and eventually a knife-in the side not
only of the Anglican Church as such but also of the Crown, whose
22. Calvin's views on law and government are discussed in MUELLER, supra
note 3 at 73-103; TONKIN, supra note 3, at 93-130; J.T. McNeill, John Calvin on Civil
Government, 42 J. OF PRESBYTERIAN HISTORY 71 (1964); H. Baron, CalvinistRepublicanism

and its HistoricalRoots, 8 CHURCH

HISTORY

30 (1939); J.

BOHATEC, CALVIN UND DAS RECHT

(1934); id., CALVINS LEHRE VON STAAT UND KIRCHE (1961).
23. H. D. Foster has used the phrase "international Calvinism" to refer to
the Calvinist and Neo-Calvinist teachings that spread throughout Europe in the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries. H.

FOSTER. PRIVATE PAPERS

147 (1929). See also J.T.

(1957). A Calvinism largely consistent
with Calvin's Institutes of the Christian Religion (1st ed., 1536) had entered Britain
via the chief Reformers, Knox, Bucer, and Bullinger, the returning Marian exiles, and
exiled Dutch and French Huguenot Calvinists. From 1575 to 1610, ninety-six editions
of Calvin's writings were published in England, and of the eighty-five editions of the
Bible printed in Elizabeth's reign sixty were the Geneva Bible in which Calvin's
MCNEILL, HISTORY AND CHARACTER OF CALVINISM

teachings were summarized. See D.

CREMEANS. THE RECEPTION OF CALVINIST THOUGHT

65-66 (1949). Yet Calvinism was accommodated to the scholasticism of Beza,
the rationalism of Perkins and his followers, Arminianism, various forms of mysticism,
and neo-Platonism. See P. TOON. HYPERCALVINISM IN ENGLISH NON-CONFORMITY 18 ff.
(1967).
IN ENGLAND
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authority derived in substantial part from its ecclesiastical supremacy.
As King James I put it, "No bishops, no king."
Yet despite some repressive measures, neither the monarch nor
his bishops seriously tried to rid the English church entirely of its
Calvinists. One reason for this was that the Puritans were strongly
anti-Roman and were needed by the Crown in the struggle against
the papacy and its Spanish and French supporters. (By the same token,
the Crown was needed by the Puritans.) Moreover, the Puritans were
great patriots, who with dedication entered English public life as
justices of the peace, members of Parliament, and in many other
capacities. In addition, Puritanism was quite strong among the minor
landed gentry and among artisans and merchants -classes that did
not have influence at the royal court but that nevertheless had to
be reckoned with. Finally, although the excesses of Puritan doctrine
and zeal were deplored by the Establishment, a number of Calvinist
tenets penetrated high places. In the 1590's, when at last a strong
campaign against Puritanism was launched, it was considerably
restrained by the fact that Archbishop Whitgift, who led the campaign, considered himself to be at least partly a Calvinist in theology.
Eventually, Puritanism survived not only Archbishop Whitgift's campaign but also the much more severe campaign of Archbishop Laud
in the 1630's.
Was there something in the Puritan belief system that helps to
explain why the Puritans were able to assume leadership in Parliament in 1640 and 1641, to mobilize the pro-Parliament, anti-royalists
forces of the country in 1642, and thereafter to lead an insurrectionary
army and to establish a revolutionary government? Was there
something in the Puritan belief system that helps to explain why the
Puritans were able to transform the English system of government
and law?
Several elements of that belief system deserve mention in that
connection. The first is the Puritan view of history. The English
Puritans- despite all the differences of belief among different
branches, different sects, indeed, different congregations-shared the
belief that human history is wholly within the providence of God, that
it is not primarily a secular story of man's struggle to achieve his
own ends but rather primarily a spiritual story of the unfolding of
God's own purposes, with man acting always as God's agent. Moreover,
patriotic English Puritans in the seventeenth century were led
by their belief in divine Providence to view England as God's elect
nation, destined to reveal and incarnate God's mission for man-
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kind."4
Second, the English Puritans were committed to radical reform
as a religious activity. They believed that God willed and commanded
"the reformation of the world." "The spirit of the whole creation,"
wrote a leading Puritan, "was about the reformation of the world."
"Reform all places, all persons and callings," said another, in a sermon preached before the House of Commons in 1641. "Reform the
benches of judgment, the inferior magistrates .

.

. " he continued.

"Reform the universities, reform the cities, reform the counties, reform
the inferior schools of learning, reform the Sabbath, reform the ordinances, the worship of God. Every plant which my heavenly father
hath not planted shall be rooted up."' Although the zeal for "the reformation of the world" subsided somewhat in England after the Restoration, it continued for some decades in Puritan-led colonies of North
America, and was revived from time to time thereafter, both in
England and America.
Third, the Puritan concept of reformation of the world was closely
connected with the emphasis on law as a means of reformation. When
the Puritans were in power during the 1640's and 1650's, over ten
thousand different pamphlets were published urging law reforms of
various kinds. This zeal for law reform reflected a deep religious conviction in a God of law, who inspires his followers to translate his
will into legal precepts. Calvinism emphasized the didactic, or
pedagogical, use of law, that is, its use in guiding faithful persons
in the paths of virtuous living. Calvin had written that in addition
to making people conscious of their sins and calling them to repen24. For an excellent short account of the providential view of history taken
by Puritans, see D. McKim, The PuritanView of History or Providence Without and
Within, 1980 EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY 215-31, esp. 227 (1980). See also T.H. BREEN. THE
CHARACTER OF THE GOOD RULER: PURITAN POLITICAL IDEALS IN NEW ENGLAND, 1630-1730
15 (1970); W. HALLER, GOD'S ELECT NATION 244-50 (1963). Breen writes:
[The Puritans] insisted that the Lord had made a compact with the English
at some indeterminable time in the past, granting them peace, prosperity
and Protestantism in exchange for obedience to scriptural law. The
Puritans regarded this agreement as a real and binding contract for which
all men could be held responsible. If the nation failed the Lord by allowing evil to flourish, He punished the entire population, saints and sinners
alike. The ruler [thus] became a crucial figure for the Puritans, because
it was his duty to make Englishmen uphold the terms of their compact
[with the Lord] whether they wanted to or not.
BREEN, at 15.
25. Quoted in M. WALZER, THE REVOLUTION OF THE SAINTS: A STUDY IN THE
ORIGIN OF RADICAL POLITICS 12 (1965).
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tance (Luther's "theological" use of the law), and in addition to deterring recalcitrant persons from misconduct by threat of penalties
(Luther's "civil" use of the law) there is a "third and principal use,
which pertains more closely to the proper purpose of the law," and
which "finds its place among believers in whose hearts the Spirit of
God already lives and reigns." The law serves to help such believers
to know better the divine will and to arouse them to obedience."
Calvin, to be sure, did not share the older Roman Catholic
understanding of law as something given, part of the very nature and
being of God. Law for Calvinists, as for Lutherans, was part of the
earthly kingdom of sin and death rather than of the heavenly kingdom
of grace and joy; nor was obedience to law a formula of works
necessary to enter that heavenly kingdom. Law was, indeed, ordained
by God but it was discerned and given expression by man's defective
will and reason. For Calvin, as for Luther, law was something that
had uses. More than Luther, however, Calvin-and the English
Puritans -stressed the positive role both of the moral law (which he
identified with natural law) and of the civil law in teaching man to
walk in the paths that God has set for him.
A fourth element in the Puritan belief system that contributed
to legal reform was its strong social dimension. The ultimate purpose
of law, according to Calvin and his followers, was not only to help
individual Christians to be upright but also thereby to create an
upright Christian community. The congregation of the faithful was
to be "a light to all the nations of the world," "a city on a hill."'
Calvinist Puritanism was essentially a communitarian religion. Each
was responsible for all. By the same token, all were responsible for
each. Breach of God's commandments by one incurred God's punishment of the whole corporate body-be it the family, the church, or

26. J. CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, ed. J. T. McNeill bk. 2,
ch. 7, para. 12 (F. L. Battles, transl., 1960). The enormous outpouring of pamphlets
and the general aims of the pamphleteers are discussed in BRAILSFORD. THE LEVELLERS
AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 453, 523-40 (1961); D. VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR
LAW REFORM 97-224 (1970). The Puritans attested to their belief in the didactic use of
the law by placing on the walls of their churches and homes long lists of simple rules
and by recitation of the Ten Commandments every Sunday morning. See G. R. CRAGG,
FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY: A STUDY OF ENGLISH THOUGHT IN THE EARLY SEVENTEENTH CEN-

147 ff. (1975).
27. Quotation from a sermon given in 1630 on The Arabella by Governor John
Winthrop entitled "A Model of Christian Charity," printed in WINTHROP PAPERS II,
295 (1931).
TURY
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the nation.28
A fifth link in the chain that bound Puritan theology to Puritan
political and legal philosophy was its stress on hard work, austerity,
frugality of time and money, reliability, discipline, vocational ambition, individual commitment to improvement of self, of neighbor, and
of society. This "Puritan ethic" was rooted in theological assumptions.
The Puritan considered his life to be a part of the divine unfolding
of God's plan for the world. To waste time was to do a disservice
to God. To be drunk or play cards or keep ill company was to disturb
his contemplation of the will of God for his life. Thus the Puritan
saw his own life as bound by a multitude of rules. His morality was
a legal morality, and he inevitably extended his legal morality to the
local community and to the nation.
Finally, and most directly connected with the English Revolution itself, is a basic Calvinist principle of government, namely, the
principle that government by representative leaders of the community,
"the elders," "the lower magistrates," is superior to government by
a single ruler, the prince. Calvin wrote that the best form of government is either "aristocracy or a system compounded of aristocracy
and democracy," such as "the Lord established among the people of
Israel." The theological basis of this theory of tempered aristocracy
was the doctrine of the sinfulness of man, his fundamental selfishness
and lust for power. It is "safer," Calvin wrote, "for a number to exercise government, so that .. .if one asserts himself unfairly, there
may be a number of censors and masters to restrain his willfulness."'
This theory was the basis also of Calvin's doctrine that when
royal government becomes too tyrannical, then the lower magistrates,
as leaders and protectors of the community, are commanded by God
"to withstand the fierce licentiousness of kings." Thus the zeal for
reformation might lead to revolution, which, however, was itself to
be limited by aristocratic communitarian principles. Although Calvin
himself had muted his advocacy of resistance to tyranny, his followers
throughout Europe during the next century proclaimed it a basic
religious doctrine."
28. Universal punishment is discussed in G.R. CRAGG, PURITANISM IN THE
PERIOD OF THE GREAT PROSECUTION 137, 168 (1957); J.S. MCGEE. THE GODLY MAN IN STUART
ENGLAND 129 (1976); BREEN, supra note 24, at 15.
29. CALVIN, supra note 26, bk. 4,ch. 2, para. 8, at 31.
30. Id. at bk. 4, ch. 20, para. 31. The doctrines of civil disobedience advocated
by the Huguenots in France were built squarely on this teaching of Calvin.
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In 1640 the English Puritans provided the theory and vision
needed to fight a civil war, overthrow the monarchy, and establish
Parliamentary supremacy. Ultimately, however, Puritanism foundered
in England, since its essentially congregational conception of government was wholly inadequate as a system for ruling a whole nation.
It led first to factionalism and disintegration and eventually succumbed
to Cromwellian dictatorship. Nevertheless, even though the Anglican
Church and the Stuart dynasty were restored in 1660, there was no
going back to pre-Puritan times. The basic Puritan beliefs that had
made the Revolution survived. I have listed six: the belief that God
is working in history through his chosen nation, England; the belief
in reformation of the world as a religious commitment; the belief that
law is a prime instrument of such reformation; the belief in the corporate character of the local community; the belief in the "Puritan
ethic;" and the belief in government either by aristocracy or by
aristocracy tempered with democracy. These beliefs remained strong
in England, although they lost their original Puritan fervor and some
of their Puritan theological foundations.
The Transformation of English Law
I turn now to some of the changes in English law that took place
during this period."
That English constitutional law underwent fundamental changes
between 1640 and 1689 is undisputed. Parliamentary supremacy was
established. The newer courts that had been created by the Tudor
kings were abolished, and the older common-law courts became
supreme over all others. Judges were given life tenure. Religious
toleration was extended to Protestant denominations. Royal powers
were limited by a written Bill of Rights.
More controversial is the scope and nature of the changes in
other branches of law, especially criminal and civil law in their procedural and substantive aspects. Legal historians have usually
emphasized sixteenth-century more than seventeenth-century

31. Among many sources see VEALL, supra note 26; STUART PRALL. THE AGITATION FOR LAW REFORM DURING THE PURITAN REVOLUTION 1640-1660 (1966); B. Shapiro, Law
Reform in Seventeenth Century England, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 280-312 (1975); id.,
Codification of the Laws in Seventeenth Century England, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 428-65 (1974);
M. Cotterell, Interregnum Law Reform: The Hale Commission of 1652, 83 ENG. HIST.
REV. 689-704 (1968); G.B. Nourse, Law Reform Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate,
75 LAW Q. REV. 512-29 (1959); G. Smith, The Reforms of the Law of England, 10 U. TORONTO Q., 469-81 (1941).
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developments in these branches of law. Moreover, they have tended
to see both sixteen and seventeenth century developments, and for
that matter eighteenth century developments as well, as gradual, incremental changes arising from within the legal system itself rather
than as rapid, fundamental changes responding to pressures from outside the law. Plucknett even speaks of "the remarkable continuity
and stability of English law during the vicissitudes of the seventeenth
century.""2
I propose a different view, namely, that in the late seventeenth
and early eighteenth centuries there were fundamental changes in
the English legal system as a whole, including not only its constitutional aspects but also its criminal and civil aspects-indeed, what
I would call a modernization of the English common law; and that
these changes were generated not only from within the law but also,
and more important, from within the entire political, economic, and
social upheaval of the time.
In the sixteenth century there had been, indeed, important
developments in English law, including the law applicable in the older
courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer. These courts
had existed since the twelfth century; they had jurisdiction chiefly
over serious crimes ("felonies") (though not over treason) and over
civil disputes involving freehold land. Their civil procedure was
characterized by an elaborate process of pleadings, designed to reach
an issue of fact that could be presented to a petty jury of neighbors
for decision "Yes," or "No," based on the previous knowledge of the
jurors. In criminal procedure, indictment was by grand jury and con-.
viction or acquittal was, once again, by a petty jury that, prior to
any trial, had informed itself of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
This archaic procedure was subjected to the same vigorous critique in sixteenth century England as the Schoeffen procedure in sixteenth century Germany. As in Germany, so in England, many called
for a rationalization and systematization of the law. In fact the
prerogative courts of the Tudor-Stuart kings operated on quite different principles from those of the common-law courts. None of
them-including the Court of Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission, the Court of Requests, the High Court of Admiralty, and
others-used the common-law system of pleadings in civil cases or
of indictment in criminal cases, and none of them used the jury method
of decision. Nor did the Chancery, which had older credentials but
32.
30 (1936).

T.F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 HARV. L. REV.
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which in many ways had become like the prerogative courts. All of
these non-common-law courts used a system of interrogation of parties and of witnesses by the court, with written depositions under
oath; all of them were in the "civilian" (as it later came to be called)actually, it was the canonist-procedural tradition.
Under the pressure of competition from the prerogative courts
and from Chancery, the older common law courts gradually began to
reform their procedure and to expand their jurisdiction. This was a
very slow process, chiefly because the common law courts owed their
very survival to the fact that by their antiquity they lent a legitimacy
to Tudor justice that it might otherwise not have had. By declaring
royal supremacy over the church in England, Henry VIII had cut
English law adrift from its moorings in the Church of Rome and had
anchored it instead to the supreme political authority of the state.
The shock of this break with the past was somewhat softened by the
perpetuation of the older royal courts, with their older, more popular,
less learned procedures. Consequently, those older courts were reluctant to change those procedures; when they did change them they
usually sought justification in the past. Hence there slowly emerged
in the sixteenth century an increasing emphasis on precedent as a
justification for both continuity and change.
In the sixteenth and especially in the first decades of the seventeenth century, the common law judges began to invoke precedent
in order to control the rival courts and to limit their jurisdiction; this
eventually brought them-and especially the Chief Justice of the
King's Bench, Sir Edward Coke-into direct conflict with the king
himself. Coke's historicism eventually became an important part of
the ideology of the English Revolution. The radical Puritan John
Lilburne used to go into the House of Commons in the 1640's with
the Bible in one hand and Coke's Institutes in the other.
The abolition of the prerogative courts by the Puritan-led Parliament in 1641 signified an enormous change in English law. On the
one hand, it meant the elimination of both the substantive and the
procedural law of those courts and, on the other hand, it stimulated
radical changes in the substance and procedure of the common law
that was now made applicable to cases previously decided in those
courts.
Thus the common law courts acquired exclusive jurisdiction over
criminal cases, with right of trial by jury for all serious offenses. This
meant the end of the inquisitorial system as it had been practiced
in the Court of Star Chamber, the Court of High Commission, and
in criminal cases in Admiralty, Chancery, and other courts. The
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1

Berman: Law and Belief in Three Revolutions
1984]

LAW AND BELIEF

notorious ex officio oath, under which a mere suspect could be required to swear to answer truthfully any questions that might be put
to him by the investigator, and against which the common law courts
had sometimes inveighed without much effect, now disappeared from
English jurisprudence. Preliminary investigation of crimes was henceforth controlled partly by the writ of habeas corpus, which was considerably expanded and finally, in 1679, made the subject of a
comprehensive statute; and partly by bail, which was also modernized
by statute. Excessive fines were condemned, as were cruel and unusual
punishments. The privilege against self-incrimination appeared for the
first time. Torture was eliminated from English criminal procedure.
Also the nature of the jury trial changed. Previously, the jury
had been an active investigative body, which was supposed to find
out the guilt or innocence of the accused in advance and then merely
to report its verdict when summoned by the court; now it became
a passive body, which, knowing nothing of the crime in advance, was
supposed to listen to evidence presented at trial. A system of more
rational proofs, which in England had previously existed only in the
ecclesiastical courts, the Chancellor's court, and the prerogative courts,
was now introduced in a new form into jury trials in the common
law courts. There appeared first the right and then the duty of
witnesses to testify in the common law courts. The common law courts
took over the contempt power of the ecclesiastical courts, Chancery,
and the prerogative courts. The distinction between fact and law was
sharpened, and the jury was given considerable independence in determining questions of fact at the same time that it was subjected to
new forms of judicial supervision in matters of law.
These developments also affected civil procedure at common law,
since jury trial was used there as well. In civil cases written pleadings
were introduced, and witnesses were subjected to examination and
cross-examination by counsel for the parties. (In criminal cases, counsel
for the accused was not allowed until 1695, and then only in cases
of treason; it was not until 1836 that counsel for the accused was
allowed in cases of felonies.) Also the language of court reports, which
previously had been Law-French, was shifted to English.
In addition, civil law was affected by the transformation of the
forms of action. By an abundant use of fictions, the action of ejectment was transformed into an action to try title to land, the action
of trover was transformed into an action to try title to chattels, the
action of special assumpsit was transformed into an action for breach
of contract, and the action of general assumpsit was transformed into
an action for unjust enrichment. Thus the old forms were retained,
but their functions were modernized.
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Of critical importance in these developments was the fact that
after 1640 the courts of common law inherited the vast jurisdiction
of the prerogative courts. Prior thereto, the common law courts were
concerned, in criminal law, principally with felonies and, in civil law,
principally with rights in land. Now they had to be concerned with
the entire range of criminal and civil causes; even those matters that
continued to fall within the remaining jurisdiction of Chancery, Admiralty, and the ecclesiastical courts were now for the first time subjected to the regulation of the cdmmon law courts, which had the final
say in the matter of jurisdiction.
One may speak, indeed, in this context, of a certain nationalization of English law. Mercantile law, for example, which had been applied in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in the courts
of Admiralty and Chancery, with their flourishing commercial jurisdiction, embodied many rules of canon law and Roman law that were
accepted by merchants throughout Europe. These now passed over
into the common law, at first in the form of commercial custom
declared by juries of merchants and eventually by integration into
the substantive common law itself.
Also the common law courts inherited some of the laws of
morality that had been developed previously in the ecclesiastical and
other courts. Thus in the famous case of the King against Sir Charles
Sidley, decided in 1664, Sir Charles was indicted for "having shown
his nude body in a balcony in Covent Garden to a great multitude
of people, and had said and done certain things to the great scandal
of Christianity." The Court of King's Bench took jurisdiction, stating
that "since at this time there is no longer a Star Chamber . .. this
Court is the custos morum ["guardian of morals"] of all the subjects
of the King, and it is now high time to punish such profane actions
done against all modesty. . . ." The Court stated further that since
the defendant was "a gentleman of a very old family (of the county
of Kent) and his estate was encumbered (not intending his ruin but
in order to reform him)"-he was to be fined 2000 marks and imprisoned for a week and placed on good behavior for three years.'
Two generations later, the common law courts also succeeded
to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over the crime of
obscenity.
In addition to such important changes in jurisdiction and procedure, with their tendency toward unification of English law under
33.

LeRoy v. Sir Charles Sidley, 1 Sid. 168, 82 Eng. Rep. 1036 (1664).
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the supremacy of the courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, a
new technique of precedent was gradually introduced. I have mentioned the ideological need for a doctrine of precedent that would
enable the common law to adduce the authority of the past for adaptation of its rules to new circumstances. In the latter seventeenth
century and thereafter, as it became increasingly important to rationalize and systematize the common law, the earlier historicism was
supplemented by a sophisticated technique of precedent. Previous decisions were subjected to a close analysis, with a distinction made between dictum and holding. This meant much great predictability of
result. Holdings in cases came to have a function somewhat similar
to that of codified rules. A science of reasoning by analogy of cases
came to be developed.
There was also a rationalization of common law rules concerning property and contract. I have referred to the transformation of
older forms of action to serve the functions of trying title to land
(ejectment) and chattels (trover). The device of the "strict settlement"
was invented to permit landed gentry to make effective arrangements,
despite the rule against perpetuities, to keep land in the same family
for many generations.
Also this was the period when it was established that a bargained exchange was binding and actionable on breach, regardless of
the absence of fault. In the famous case of Paradine and Jane, decided in 1648, at the height of the Puritan Revolution, a lessor sued a
lessee for nonpayment of rent. The tenant defended on the ground
that due to the occupation of the leased premises by Prince Rupert's
army, it was impossible for him to enjoy the benefit of his contract
and he therefore should be excused from liability. He cited canon law,
civil (i.e. Roman) law, military law, moral law, the law of reason, the
law of nature, and the law of nations. The court held that by the
common law of England a lessee for years is liable for the rent, even
though the land be impossible to occupy.' This was an early-perhaps
the earliest- authoritative formulation of the principle of strict liability
for breach of contract. The court said that where a duty or charge
is. created by law, the party will be excused if he is not at fault, "but
when the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon
himself he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any
accident or inevitable necessity, because he might have provided
against it by his contract."

34. Paradine and Jane, Style 47, 82 Eng. Rep. 519 (1647); also reported in
Aleyn 26, 82 Eng. Rep. 897.
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Law AND Belief in the English Revolution
We come back once again to the word "and": law "and" belief,
law "and" revolution. I have indicated certain revolutionary changes
that took place in the English belief system after 1640; I have also
indicated certain revolutionary changes that took place in the English
legal system in roughly the same period. But what is the connection
between the two sets of changes?
Some external connections are obvious. Puritanism was undoubtedly the spark which ignited the Civil War, which in turn led
eventually, after many upheavals, to the victory of Parliament over
the Crown and of the common law courts over its rivals. The Puritans
in seventeenth century England-like the Lutherans in sixteenth century Germany, the Jacobins in eighteenth century France, and the
Bolsheviks in twentieth century Russia-provided not only the zeal
but also the theory and the vision that were needed to change radically
the political, the constitutional, and ultimately the prevailing legal
system. This "but for" causal connection between Puritanism and
English constitutional law is not without importance, and it does not
deserve to be ignored, as it often has been in the conventional
historiography. All our modern Western legal systems, including the
English, have their origins in violent revolutions, which in turn have
their origins in radical ideologies.
We are looking, however, for more intimate connections between
belief systems and legal systems. Do seventeenth century English
religious beliefs help to explain why England opted for Parliamentary supremacy as against royal supremacy, for the common law as
against rival systems, for jury trial as against trial by professional
judges, for the adversary system of proof as against the inquisitorial
system, for the doctrine of precedent as against systematization by
codes, for strict liability for breach of contract as against contractual
liability based on fault? In other words, is English law rooted in the
Puritan Revolution merely in a chronological sense or is it rooted in
it in the sense that it derives nourishment from it?
I have already suggested some positive connections of this kind.
Calvinist theology itself favored aristocratic government over monarchical and advocated the God-given right and duty of lower magistrates
to resist tyrants. These and other Calvinist teachings were invoked
to support limitations placed on the English monarchy by the Long
Parliament in 1640-1642 and during the Civil War that followed, the
subjection of the monarchy to Parliament in the period after its
restoration in 1660, and, finally, in 1688, the forced abdication of the
monarch and his replacement by a new dynasty subject to the severe
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1
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restrictions placed on it by the Bill of Rights of 1689. The sixteenth
century Lutheran and Anglican conception of the prince as the bearer
of the religious mission to be the supreme governor of the earthly
kingdom gave way to the Calvinist conception that the supreme duty
of government is borne by the "magistracy," which ultimately meant,
in England, the landed gentry, especially as they were represented
in Parliament. Locke's theories of social contract and of government
by consent of the governed, expounded in his Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689-90 as a justification of the Parliamentary
system as established by the Glorious Revolution, were based essentially on liberal Calvinist doctrine. Underlying Locke's theory was the
Calvinist emphasis on man's inherent selfishness. It was this that required the reciprocal limitations on power-on the power of subjects
as well as on the power of rulers-that are implicit in the concept
of a contract."
The Calvinist doctrine of original sin also supported the idea of
a written constitution, which in effect embodied the social contract
and made it, by virtue of the writing, more difficult to break. In 1649,
a written constitution called the "Agreement of the People," had been
proposed but not adopted, and in 1653 a written constitution, called
the "Instrument of Government," had been adopted-the first national
written constitution in history. It was, however, wholly ineffective
against Cromwell's dictatorship. Such experiments were not repeated
after the Restoration. Nevertheless, they bore fruit in the Bill of
Rights of 1689 and in the acceptance of that document, together with
Magna Carta, the Petition of Right of 1628, and other written texts,
as constituent parts of England's "unwritten" constitution. It is true
that the theory of an "unwritten" - one might better call it a "halfwritten"- constitution left the way open to the acceptance of a parallel
theory of absolute Parliamentary power. Parliament, some said, could,
if it wished, enact a law turning all men into women. Fortunately,
the matter remained hypothetical. In theory, the omnicompetence of
Parliament was qualified by its duty to preserve the liberties of the
subject and to respect the requirements of natural justice. In prac-

35. "Locke's political views were little more than a distillation of concepts
that had long been current coin in Calvinist political theory ......
W.S. HUDSON.
RELIGION IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL

ACCOUNT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN

POLITICAL RELIGIOUS LIFE 94 (3rd ed., 1981). See also HUDSON, JOHN LOCKE: HEIR OF PURITAN
POLITICAL THEORISTS, in G.L. Hunt, ed., CALVINISM AND THE POLITICAL ORDER 108-29 (1965),

where many of Locke's ideas are traced to the devout Presbyterian Samuel Rutherford, author of Lex Rex (1644). For an account of Locke's Puritan upbringing and the
liberal character of his Calvinist background, see FOSTER, supra note 3, at 153-78; LANG,
supra note 3, at 86 ff.
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tice, Parliament rarely invoked a competence to wield unlimited power.
(When it did so with respect to the American colonies, they made
their own Revolution.)
In tracing such basic constitutional principles to Calvinism, one
must bear in mind not only Calvinist doctrine but also Calvinist practice. Aristocracy-or aristocracy tempered with democracy-had not

only been advocated by Calvin as the best form of government; it
had also been introduced into the ecclesiastical polity. Calvinist
churches were governed by elected ministers and lay elders. Similarly, the Calvinist doctrine of social contract was introduced into practice in Geneva, where all citizens were summoned in groups to accept the "covenant" between God and the church, to take an oath
to obey the Ten Commandments, and to swear loyalty to the city.3"
Their experience, and not only their theory, was also of crucial
importance in the development by the Puritans of constitutional principles of civil rights- particularly their experience in openly disobeying, on grounds of Christian conscience, the oppressive laws of the
Tudor-Stuart monarchy. Many Puritans had refused to take the ex
officio oath as required. by the Court of High Commission under
Archbishop Laud: such an oath, they said, which would require them
to swear, in advance of any charges made, to answer truthfully any
question that might be asked, violated their sacred obligation, based
on the Bible, not to swear oaths; and furthermore, it violated the
English common law. Puritans also resorted to the writ of habeas corpus to challenge the jurisdiction of courts established by the king on
the basis of his own prerogative-the Court of Star Chamber, the
Court of High Commission, and others; and when they came to power
they abolished such "prerogative" courts. They asserted a right to
refuse to testify against themselves in criminal proceedings, and a
right not to be prosecuted for an act that had not previously been
declared to be criminal. They objected to excessive bail, excessive
fines, cruel and unusual punishments, the presumption of guilt, the
subjection of the jury to the will of the judge, royal interference in
adjudication, and torture. They objected to these on principle: first,
that they were against the will of God; second, that they violated
"the ancient constitution," the common law of former times -that is,
before the Tudor-Stuart monarchy had assumed supremacy over the
36. Cf. J.T. MCNEILL, supra note 23, at 13542. In Puritan New England as well,
Roscoe Pound comments, "covenants and compacts were the basis of all community
life, political and religious." Roscoe Pound, Puritanism and the Common Law, 15 AM.
L.R. 810, 819 (1911).
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Men like John Hampden, John Lilburne, Walter Udall, William
Penn, and thousands of other Puritans (I use the name in its broadest
sense) gave England-and ultimately America-civil rights by being
willing, on grounds of Christian conscience, to go to prison for them.
Later, a Puritan-led Parliament enacted legislation guaranteeing many
of the rights on which Puritans had previously insisted in vain. Still
later, Parliaments not led by Puritans reaffirmed and added to such
legislation.
It may be somewhat less easy to discern religious influences in
the seventeenth century tendency to rationalize the common-law rules
of property and contract. Here major roles were played by political
and economic considerations as well as by the new scientific outlook
of the seventeenth century. There was a drive toward security of property rights and of contractual transactions; there was a drive toward
rationality, in the sense of calculability or predictability.
Puritanism also played a role. Efforts to rationalize the English
common law, as well as to secure property and contract rights, were
connected with the Puritan emphasis on order and discipline: "God
being the God of order and not of confusion hath Commanded in his
word and put man into a Capasitie in some measure to observe and
bee guided by good and wholsome lawes.... ." "Discipline," Calvin
had said, "serves as the sinews [of the church] through which the
members of the body hold together, each in its own place."39
Developments in the law of contract and property were also connected
with the Calvinist emphasis on voluntary action, the act of will, in
the service of God, together with God's faithfulness in response.
Calvinists taught that there were two covenants, one between God
and the community, including the ruler and the people as parties, the
other between the ruler and the people. These covenants were seen
in terms of the same values of rationality, predictability, and security
that were emphasized in the law of property and contract.
Finally, there were important connections between Puritan
casuistry and Puritan historicism, on the one hand, and the seventeenth century English lawyer's emphasis on analogy of cases and
on historical precedent.
37.

Cf J.G.A.

POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW:

A

(1957).
38. The Address to the General Laws of New Plymouth (1658), 11 Records of
the Colony of New Plymouth Laws, 1623-82, at 72, Pulsifer, ed., 1861.
39. CALVIN, supra note 26, bk. 4, ch. 12, para 1.
STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
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To stress these links between seventeenth century English legal
developments and Puritanism is not to ignore their links also with
Anglicanism, including not only those features of Anglicanism which
it shared with Puritanism but also those features which contrasted
with Puritanism. 0 For example, the historicism of the seventeenth
century English common lawyers, exemplified above all in the writings
of Sir Edward Coke and in his judgments when on the bench, is much
more akin to the historicism of Bishop Hooker and of the Church of
England than to that of Calvin and his English followers. The English
Puritans followed Calvin in looking first to Biblical history and Biblical
examples. They added, however, a vision of England as an "elect nation" destined to fulfill God's plan of history. Anglican historicismdeveloped only partly in response to Puritanism -taught the fiction
of a continuously developing Anglican church, always fundamentally
the same, always English, never really Roman, "comprehensive"
enough to embrace widely differing intellectual approaches, founded
not on doctrinal consistency but on historical continuity. This, of
course, was the kind of historicism adopted ultimately by the English
common law.
Also the language and style of the seventeenth century English
common law was more similar to that of the Book of Common Prayer
than to that of Calvin's Institutes or the English Puritan tracts. Indeed, Calvinist doctrine was congenial to codification of law, and it
was no accident that in the Puritan period of the English Revolution
there were great pressures toward codification of the English common law. Ultimately, however, English law adopted a quite different
mode of systematization, namely, systematization by forms of action
and by precedent-one that was controlled primarily by the judiciary
rather than by the university professors. English Puritans were eventually able to find a good deal in their religious upbringing to support a judge-made systematization of the law, even though they might
have found even more to support codification. The Anglican outlook,
however, would have found codification quite uncongenial.
The interconnection between the transformation of the English
system of law and the transformation of the English system of beliefs
found vivid expression in the life and work of Matthew Hale, who,
like the sixteenth century German von Schwarzenberg, represented
in his own person both the legal genius and the religious genius of
his time.
40. For comparison and contrast of Anglican and Puritan theology and ideology,
see H. BAKER, THE WARS OF TRUTH, chap. 5 (1969); J.F. NEW, PURITAN AND ANGLICAN
(1964).
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Holdsworth has called Hale a "consummate master of English
law," "easily the greatest English lawyer of his day," "the first of
our great modern common lawyers.""' Born in 1609, he had already
distinguished himself at the bar when the Puritans seized power in
1641. In 1652 he headed an important law reform committee appointed
by Parliament, known as the Hale Commission, which proposed fundamental changes in English law. From 1653 to 1657 he was a judge
of the Court of Common Pleas. In 1660, with the return of Charles
II, Hale became Chief Baron of the Exchequer and in 1671 Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, which he remained until just before his
death in 1676. His reputation as a lawyer rested not only on his great
ability in these practical roles but also, and even more, on his scholarship. He was a master of constitutional and legal history and the
author of the first history of English law ever written. 2 His writings
on English criminal and civil law represent the first systematic studies
in those fields." Moreover, he was a serious student of the Roman
law and also wrote tracts in the fields of mathematics, natural science,
philosophy, and theology."
Hale's career as a lawyer and legal scholar cannot be divorced
41.

W.S.

HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW,

VI, 581 (1927). The account of

Hale's life and work given in the text is drawn chiefly from Holdsworth, VI, 574-95
and from E. HEWARD, MATTHEW HALE (1972). See also D.E.C. YALE, HALE AS A LEGAL
HISTORIAN (Seldon Society Lecture, 1976).

42.

Hale's

HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW

was first published in 1713. (None of

Hale's voluminous legal writings were published in his lifetime, though many of them
circulated widely in manuscript).

43.

Hale's

HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN,

first published in 1736, was

not a history but a textbook on criminal law and procedure dealing with capital crimes.
Heward writes (133-34): "This book is a tour de force. It is systematic and detailed.
. . . Hale succeeded in reducing the mass of material to a coherent account of the
criminal law relating to capital offenses. ....
"
Hale's ANALYSIS OF THE LAW divides the law into two main divisions, namely, civil
law and criminal law, but itself deals only with civil matters, which it divides into
civil rights or interests, wrongs or injuries related to those rights, and relief or remedies
applicable to those wrongs. Civil rights are subdivided in the Romanist style into rights
of persons and rights of things.
44. Hale admired Roman law and, in the words of his contemporary biographer,
Burnet, "lamented much that it was so little studied in England." Quoted in HEWARD,
supra note 41, at 26. Hale's systematization of English law was greatly influenced
by Romanist legal science as it had developed in the West since the late eleventh
century. However, Hale did not write any tracts on Roman law. His systematization
of English law was also greatly influenced by his knowledge of the exact and natural
sciences, on which he did write several long tracts. He was well acquainted with Boyle
and Newton and with some of the founders of the Royal Society of London. Three
of his discourses on religion were published after his death by his friend the Puritan
minister, Richard Baxter. They are summarized in HEWARD, id. at 127-28.
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from his deep religious convictions. Raised a Puritan, he retained a
passion for piety, order, discipline, and moral responsibility. Yet he
was also loyal to the Church of England. He wrote a number of meditational and devotional tracts which reflected his adherence to both
Calvinism and Anglicanism. In the period of Puritan ascendancy, he
remained a royalist and advised Strafford, Bramston, Laud, and other
persons accused by the Long Parliament, and when Charles I was
tried for treason by a special court, the so-called High Court of Justice,
Hale advised him to plead to the jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he was
able conscientiously to serve under Oliver Cromwell (though he refused
to be reappointed to the Court of Common Pleas in 1658 by Oliver's
son and successor Richard), and after the restoration of the monarchy,
which Hale had helped to facilitate, he befriended and defended Protestant Non-Conformists with the same openness and integrity with
which he had formerly befriended and defended Anglican royalists.
Hale was driven by a deep Christian faith to live and to work
without deceit, without greed for money or power, without injustice;
he represented in his person the new "public spirit" which the English
Revolution put forward as a principal basis of legitimacy."' At the
bar, Hale refused to take cases that he considered to be unjust; also
he would often forego fees in order himself to arbitrate disputes that

45. As "public opinion" became a principal source of the legitimacy of governmental authority in France from the time of the French Revolution (see infra, note
60), so "public spirit" was a principal source of the legitimacy of governmental authority
in England from the time of the English Revolution of the seventeenth century. Public
spirit included not only civic zeal but also loyalty to tradition as well as other
"aristocratic" virtues. It was defined by de Tocqueville in the early nineteenth century as including "the affections of a man with his birthplace . . . united with a taste
for ancient customs and a reverence for traditions of the past....
patriotism sometimes
stimulated by religious enthusiasm." ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE. DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA,
Phillips Bradley, ed., 274 (1945). The phrase itself goes back to 1654, when Whitlock
wrote: "Persons with Publike Spirits, are of a goodnesse Angelicall." Quoted in Oxford English Dictionary under heading "Public spirit." Lecky characterizes the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England as an age of public spirit; although
public spirit diminished substantially in the middle of the eighteenth century, he writes,
it nevertheless remained stronger than in other countries of Europe. W.E.H. LECKY,
ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, 1188-98, 489-90, 505-12 (1892). In the early 1700's
the coffee houses of London were called "the School of Publick Spirit, where every
Man . . . learns the most hearty contempt of his own Personal Sordid Interest . .
• and devotes himself to ... his Country .... " Daily Gazeteer, London, July 4, 1737.
A pamphleteer in London in 1714 sharply criticized the Whigs for neglecting public
spirit and being "ready to gratifie their Ambition and Revenge by all desperate Methods;
wholly alienate from Truth, Law, Religion, Mercy, Conscience, or Honour." Pamphlet
entitled "The Publick Spirit of the Whigs," London, 1714, available in Widener Library,
Harvard University.
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came to him. As a judge, he would subordinate strict law to equity
or else use his mastery of the techniques and subtleties of strict law
to achieve a result dictated by conscience. He refused the gifts that
were customarily offered by persons seeking favors or else, if it was
necessary to accept them, he would require that they be in the form
of money, which he then gave to the poor. His extraordinary generosity was made apparent by the relatively small estate that he left when
he died. "His dread of ostentation and vanity led him to go so shabbily
clothed that even [his close friend the Puritan minister Richard] Baxter remonstrated with him."48 In Holdsworth's words, "Hale was a
man of a really saintly character, who, by his genuine goodness, attracted the affection [not only of those who knew him well but also]
of all those with whom he came into merely passing contact." 7
In combining impeccable moral and personal qualities with superb
professional skills and intellectual powers, Hale, like Schwarzenberg
before him, inevitably made a strong impact on his contemporaries.
Even more important, in both cases, was the nature of the impact.
Hale, like Schwarzenberg, helped to bring about fundamental changes
in the pre-existing legal system that were responsive to fundamental
changes that were taking place at the same time in the belief system
of the society. Hale's deepest beliefs, which were characteristic of the
beliefs of his time, not only influenced his own personal and professional life but also found expression in the substantive contributions
which he made to the development of English law.
Many examples can be given of specific legal contributions that
reflected Hale's religious outlook. As a judge, he set an example of
scrupulous fairness to prisoners in criminal cases. He once persuaded
a jury, with some difficulty, to acquit a man who had stolen a loaf
of bread because he was starving. He shared the overriding Puritan
concern with poor relief; his "Discourse Touching Provision for the
Poor," written in 1659, contained a detailed plan for providing work
for the poor, anticipating reforms that were only carried out a centuryand-a-half later. On the other hand, he also shared the Puritan horror
of witchcraft and in 1664 he imposed the death penalty, as provided
by statute, on two women found by the jury to be guilty of bewitching
48
certain children.

46.
47.

HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 578.
Id. at 579. Holdsworth compares Hale's character to that of Sir Thomas

48.

See

More.
HEWARD,

supra note 41, at 71-86, and HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at

578-79.
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More important than these and other specific contributions which
Hale made as a judge and as an advocate of law reform was his more
general contribution to the very conception of law. Hale, above all
in his writings, introduced a systematization of English law based
primarily on the concept of its historical development. This historical
jurisprudence had been nourished initially in his university days at
Oxford, where he had come under the influence of the great Puritan
legal historian John Selden. Living in the prerevolutionary period of
struggle between the common law courts and the prerogative courts,
Selden had emphasized the medieval tradition of limitations upon the
royal prerogative. Living in the postrevolutionary period, Hale emphasized not only the medieval roots of the English legal tradition
but also its capacity to evolve and to adapt itself to new needs. Laws
must change with the times, he wrote, or they will lose their
usefulness."
Hale also went far beyond Selden in deriving from the evolution
of the English legal tradition a systematization of rules, principles,
concepts, and standards. Here he was helped both by his deep
knowledge of Roman law and by his studies of natural science.
Hale's biographer, Burnet, reports that some persons once said
to Hale that they "looked on the common law as a study that could
not be brought into a scheme, nor formed into a rational science, by
reason of the indigestedness of it, and the multiplicity of cases in it."
Hale's reply was decisive. He "was not of their mind," he said; and
he drew on a large sheet of paper "a scheme of the whole order and
parts of it ...to the great satisfaction of those to whom he sent it. ' M
Hale proved by his own example that the English common law
was not a wilderness of single instances, but an evolving system which
he, at least, could grasp as an integrated whole.
That Hale's historical systematization of English law was rooted
in his religious convictions, both Puritan and Anglican, may be
demonstrated by contrasting it with other methods of systematization of law. Hale did not attempt to show that English law is to be

49. Hale wrote: "The matter changeth the custom; the contracts the commerce;
the dispositions educations tempers of men and societies change in a long tract of
time; and so must their lawes in some measure be changed, or they will not be usefull
for their state and condition." Quoted in HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 593. Hale's
CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE AMENDMENT AND ALTERATION OF LAWS is a systematic
analysis of policies and techniques of law reform. It is digested in HEWARD, supra note
41, at 156-66.
50. Quoted in HOLDSWORTH, supra note 41, at 584.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1

Berman: Law and Belief in Three Revolutions
LAW AND BELIEF

1984]

understood and tested primarily by reference to divine law and natural
law, as Roman Catholic jurisprudence maintained. Nor did he attempt
to show that English law is to be understood and tested by justice
and the common weal, as taught in Schwarzenberg's Lutheran
jurisprudence. Hale asserted, of course, the validity of divine law and
natural law, which he equated with Christian revelation and the Christian religion, respectively; and he asserted the claims of justice and
utility. But he also asserted the independent validity of English law
as such, which evolved in the first instance through experience,
through custom and usage, and which was suited to the character
of the English people.
Hale's historical jurisprudence may be contrasted not only with
Roman Catholic and Lutheran legal thought but also with the rationalistic and individualistic legal thought that was characteristic of
the eighteenth century Enlightenment and of the period following the
French Revolution.
The links between Hale's jurisprudence and his religious beliefs
are to be found above all in his emphasis on the God-given historicity
of the English people and of their legal institutions. Hale denounced
the doctrine of sovereignty proclaimed by his contemporary, Thomas
Hobbes; Hobbes's "speculations" concerning the unlimited power of
the sovereign to repeal and alter laws or to take the property of his
subjects as he pleases, Hale stated, are contradicted in England by
the existence of laws and customs that bind the sovereign. "The laws
and customs of the kingdom are facts which exist," he wrote in answer
to Hobbes." That is, they are historical facts, providential facts, and
therefore superior to any sovereignty, any government. By the same
token they formed, for Hale, a system of facts whose interrelationships with each other could be studied scientifically.
The belief that God has providentially revealed himself in the
ongoing history of the English common law is the Puritan and Anglican
legacy of the seventeenth century English Revolution to Western
jurisprudence.
IV.

THE ENLIGHTENMENT, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION, AND THE
NAPOLEONIC CODES

France in 1789 was the largest country of Europe, with some
twenty-five million inhabitants-three times more than in England.

51.

Quoted in

HEWARD,

ON HOBBES' DIALOGUE OF THE LAW

supra note 41, at 140. The text of Hale's REFLECTIONS
may be found in the appendix to HOLDSWORTH, supra

note 41, V, at 500.
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It was divided administratively into thirty-five provinces, thirty-eight
military districts, one-hundred-and-forty-two bishoprics, and innumerable local frontiers where tolls and customs duties were imposed
on travelers. These units were governed generally by local patrician
oligarchies, whether of the higher clergy or of the nobility or both.
In addition to the clergy and nobility, which were characterized as
the First and Second Estates, respectively, there was a flourishing
Third Estate consisting of officials, lawyers, teachers, merchants,
artisans, well-to-do farmers, and others.
France was an autocracy. The king was considered to have absolute authority; that is, he was the supreme legislator, judge, and
executor of the laws, and was himself "absolved" from obedience to
them. All officials, central and local, exercised their authority in his
name and as his agents.
There were two symbolic limitations on royal power. The appellate courts, called Parlements, of which there were thirteen, consisted of judges who were noble either by birth or by office, whose
families had purchased their judicial office and were therefore irremovable by the king; the Parlements claimed the right to advise
the king on the limits of his power-they were custodians of the
medieval tradition of constitutionalism, although in fact they had no
effective means of checking royal abuses. The second symbolic limitation on the king's power was the historical institution of the Estates
General, the assembly of representatives of the three estates, which
had power to veto royal taxes and to advise the king. This was an
even less effective protection against royal abuses, since it could only
meet at the call of the king and the king had not called it into
existence since 1614.
Royal government, including royal military activity, was carried
on at the king's private expense, except that he could levy taxes within
limits set by tradition. The church was not taxed at all, though it
owned a substantial part of the land of France. The abundant
privileges of the aristocracy also included exemptions from various
taxes. King Louis XVI, who had come to the throne in 1774, financed
French assistance to the American Revolution largely by extravagant
borrowing. By 1787 the servicing of the royal debt had driven the
crown to the verge of bankruptcy. The aristocracy would not give
up its privileges. Meanwhile there were hunger riots and peasant
revolts. The Parlements had already been moved on several occasions
to advise the king that he was exceeding the limits of his powers.
In 1788, Necker, recalled as Minister of Finance by popular demand,
persuaded the king to allow him to call for elections and to convene
the Estates General in order to raise money.
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The Estates General met at Versailles in May 1789-for the first
time in 175 years! There was a sharp conflict between the deputies
of the Third Estate and those of the other two estates. In June the
Third Estate took the title of National Assembly and assumed full
sovereign powers. The king took the side of the other two estates.
On July 14 a crowd stormed the royal prison, the Bastille; this act
was immediately recognized as a revolution -indeed as "the" Revolution. It symbolized for all Europe the fall of absolute monarchy. The
king accepted representatives of the Third Estate as rulers of the
city of Paris. The ecclesiastical hierarchy and the nobility now stepped forward to renounce their privileges-solemnly and in detail ("the
renunciations"). Throughout France, the old administrative and judicial
authorities dissolved.
In August 1789 the National Assembly adopted a Declaration
of the Rights of Man and Citizen, which proclaimed civil rights and
civil liberties. Its first article expressed a basic ideal of the Revolution: "Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can only be based on general utility." Article 3 stated: "The
source of all sovereignty resides essentially in the nation . . ." A
wholesale reorganization of the country's administrative structure was
introduced. The entire legal system was reformed.
In the decade after 1789 France was in a constant state of turmoil. The various factions which had helped to bring on the Revolution fought viciously among themselves. Written constitutions came
and went-ten different ones between 1789 and 1815. Meanwhile there
was the constant threat that the royalists would regain power, backed
by the Roman Catholic hierarchy and by various foreign powers. The
list of leaders executed or murdered under successive Revolutionary
regimes included King Louis XVI, Marie-Antoinette, Marat, Danton,
Robespierre-in all, there were over 14,000 victims of the Terror and
civil war, of whom only about a tenth were nobles.
Various Revolutionary governments launched a series of warsmost of them disastrous-against Austria, Prussia, Belgium, the
Rhineland, Savoy, Nice, England, Holland, Italy, Switzerland, Malta,
Egypt. A young military commander from Corsica, Napoleon Bonaparte, became a hero in some of these campaigns. The people of France
were ready for a dictatorship, and in 1799 Napoleon seized power.
He presented himself as the fulfillment of the spirit of 1789. One might
call him the Stalin of the French Revolution.
Wherever Napoleon's armies went in Europe they carried with
them something of the French Revolution and especially its slogans
of liberation from aristocratic privileges. Even after the final defeat
of Napoleon in 1815 and the restoration of the Bourbon dynasty, it
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was impossible to turn the clock back to the ancien rigime. The permanent achievements of the French Revolution were finally established
in 1830 when the Chamber of Deputies -invited Louis Phillipe, Duke
of Orleans, to assume the throne as a constitutional monarch.
Thus the French Revolution may be dated not, as it often is,
from 1789 to 1799 but from 1789 to 1830, just as the English Revolution may be dated from 1640 to 1689, and the German Revolution
from 1517 to 1555.
The Belief System Embodied in the French Revolution; Deism
The belief system embodied in the French Revolution-that is,
the structure of ideas and attitudes reflected in the policies of the
new regime-had its origin in the eighteenth century European movement called "the Enlightenment." Among the most famous French participants in this movement were (1) Montesquieu, for many years the
presiding judge of the High Court of Bordeaux, whose book The Spirit
of the Laws, written in 1748, remains a classic of modern social theory;
(2) Voltaire, satirist, historian, man of letters and leading philosophe,
who wrote his first play, Oedipus, in 1718 and died in full vigor in
1778 at the age of 84; (3) Diderot, a man of universal knowledge, who
put together the ideas of the Enlightenment in a huge set of volumes
called the Encyclopedia; and (4) Jean-Jacques Rousseau, whose Confessions made him the man of the age and whose Social Contract,
published in 1762, was a principal source of inspiration for the revolutionary dictator Robespierre among countless others. A great many
others could also be listed among the intellectual leaders of the mideighteenth
century whose ideology became the ideology of the Revo5
lution.

1

Before describing the tenets of the Enlightenment, I should note
that this was the first European belief system that was developed
outside of any organized church by people who were for the most
part not Christians in the conventional sense, and were, indeed, in
many cases avowed anti-Christians. The new belief system was neither
Calvinist nor Lutheran nor Roman Catholic-nor any combination of
these. It built, to be sure, partly on the writings of seventeenth cen52.

For an account of the influence of the Enlightenment on the French Revolu-

NORMAN HAMPSON, THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1968)
ORIGINES INTELLECTUELLES DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE

tion, see

(esp. 251-83); D. MORNET. LES
(1954) (esp. 469-477); Henri M.

Peyre, The Influence of Eighteenth Century Ideas on the French Revolution, 10 J. OF
THE HIST. OF IDEAS 63 (1949); WILLIAM CHURCH, THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT
ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: CREATIVE, DISASTROUS, OR INCONCLUSIVE? (1964).
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tury English philosophers and scientists such as John Locke and Isaac
Newton, who themselves were devout Christians; but it ignored their
theology and built only on their secular writings, without regard to
the fact that those writings were considered by their authors to be
devoted solely to the "earthly kingdom," in which God was present
but hidden.
The word "secular" takes on a new meaning when it is applied
to the world-view of the eighteenth century philosophes. Prior to the
sixteenth century political power in Roman Catholic Christendom was
divided between the ecclesiastical and the secular "swords." In the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the idea had become widespread
that all political authority, including that wielded by the ecclesiastical
hierarchy, is secular, "earthly," in contrast to the "heavenly realm"
of Gospel and grace-whether conceived in Lutheran terms or in
Calvinist. For the intellectual leaders of the eighteenth century
Enlightenment, however, there was neither a "spiritual sword" nor
a "heavenly" realm. God was pushed back to a remote beginning. The
secular realm--the world of time-had indeed been created a long
time ago by a "supreme artisan," or a Supreme Being, and had then
been given it direction, its design, its purposes. But the God of Voltaire
and Rousseau did not intervene in the nature that he had once created.
These religious tenets, called Deism, were an essential part of
the belief system of the Enlightenment. Deism was founded, to be
sure, on reason; it was a system of rational propositions based on
observation of nature, including human nature. The source of reason
was the intellectual capacity of every individual person; Deism had
no church. Nevertheless, God was an essential part of the Deist belief
system. Reason, it was said, teaches every person who is willing to
exercise it that the universe was created by God, and that according
to God's design man should use his reason to do good and to avoid
evil. Although they attacked traditional Christianity, most philosophes
vigorously denied that they were atheists or pantheists. Voltaire, for
example, criticized Spinoza for failing to recognize that there is a
divine Providence which made eyes to see, minds to reason. "How
is it that [Spinoza] did not glance at these mechanisms," Voltaire asks,
"these agents, each of which has it purpose, and investigate whether
they do not prove the existence of a supreme artisan?"' "The whole
philosophy of Newton," Voltaire wrote, "leads of necessity to the
knowledge of a Supreme Being who created everything, arranged all
things of his own free will."'
53.

Cited by

54.

Id. at 78.

HAMPSON, supra note
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Thus the philosophes- in general - believed that there is a cosmic

order, that it was created originally by the Deity, and that it was
*designed to operate harmoniously for the benefit of mankind. They
believed in what Jefferson, in the Declaration of Independence, called
"the laws of Nature and of Nature's God." It was, in fact, their belief
in the laws of Nature's God that led the philosophes to proclaim universal human happiness as the highest goal, and universal liberty, equality, and fraternity as the highest means of achieving that goal. Deism
was a Christian heresy. As Carl Becker has put it, "[The philosophes]
had put off the fear of God, but maintained a respectful attitude
toward the Deity. They ridiculed the idea that the universe had been
created in six days, but still believed it to be a beautifully articulated
machine designed by the Supreme Being according to a rational plan
as an abiding place for mankind ....

They renounced the authority

of church and Bible, but exhibited a naive faith in the authority of
nature and reason. They scorned metaphysics, but were proud to be
called philosophers."55
The political, economic, and social implications of the religion of
Deism are apparent. Its individualism and its rationalism led inevitably
to an emphasis on reform of existing conditions for the benefit of the
majority of individuals living in a given society. It was utilitarian in
both the popular and technical sense of that term; indeed, it was the
young Beccaria who, in 1765, with Voltaire's endorsement, in proposing substantial reforms of communal law, first coined the slogan of
utilitarianism later adopted by Jeremy Bentham, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."
The philosophes of the French Enlightenment taught that the
privileges of the aristocracy were not only unjust but also illogicalin other words, that the reasons hitherto given to justify them were
false. This was an essential precondition of the Revolution.
The philosophes also provided major elements of the political program later adopted by leaders of the Revolution. Montesquieu's Spirit
of the Laws had expounded the theory of separation of powers; he
attributed this theory to the English system of government, but in
fact he altered the English theory substantially by placing the functions of legislation, executing, and judging in three wholly separate
compartments, with legislation supreme over the other two. This paved
the way for the development of a theory of the judicial function as
the objective, consistent, and logical application of statutory law to
55. C. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS
30-31 (1932).
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specific cases. Montesquieu had also taught that laws have the purpose of promoting individual liberty and economic equality; this, too,
became part of the program of the Revolution."
Rousseau may also be credited with providing major elements
in the later political program of the Revolution. He taught that law
should rectify inequalities that arise from natural differences among
people. "For the very reason that the force of things always tends
to destroy equality," he wrote, "the force of legislation must always
tend to maintain it."57 Rousseau, like other intellectual leaders of the
Enlightenment, attacked specific aristocratic privileges. In his
Discourse on Inequality he proposed that inheritances ought to be
reduced by taxes, and that those who owned no land receive some.
In general, however, the intellectual leaders of the eighteenth
century did not prophesy a Revolution such as that which broke out
in 1789. They did not propose the overthrow of the monarchy. "In
all France there were not ten of us who were republicans before 1789,"
wrote the Revolutionary lawyer Camille Desmoulins.
The philosophes had not preached a revolution. They were
reformers, not revolutionaries. They presented a critique of the
existing regime, together with proposals for changing it, not for
abolishing it. Their critique, and the philosophy that underlay it,
became part of the belief system of those who later overthrew the
regime and established a new one. Above all, the individualism of the
Enlightenment and its rationalism -these two basic elements from
whose combinations were derived its utilitarianism and its emphasis
on liberty and equality-became fundamental principles of the Revolution. But the Revolution also added other elements that were only
implicit, at most, in the Enlightenment philosophy. One such element
was the belief in public opinion as the ultimate political authority.
Another was nationalism.
The phrase "public opinion"-l'opinionpublique-emerged in the
1780's in one of the leading salons of Paris, Necker's circle. This was
after more than thirty years of intense agitation among the intellectuals of France, especially in the large cities. Ideas had fermented
56.

CHARLES Louis DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU. NOTES SUR L'ANGLETERRE vii,

(1729). Cf. MONTESQUIEU.

195

L'ESPRIT DES LOIS, OU DU RAPPORT QUE LES LOIS DOIVENT AVOIR

AVEC LA CONSTITUTION DE CHAQUE GOUVERNEMENT. LES MOEURS, LE CLIMAT. LA RELIGION, LE

COMMERCE, ETC

bk. VI (1748).

57. J. ROUSSEAU, CONTRAT SOCIAL, bk. 2, ch. xi (1762).
58. Quoted in PEYRE, supra note 52, at 73. Peyre adds, "Furthermore, he
(Desmoulins] was not one of those ten."
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through salons, clubs, circles, and societies of all kinds; through pamphlets, tracts, periodicals, books; through the theater (Beaumarchais'
Marriage of Figaro, for example, was an attack upon aristocratic
privilege whose repercussions were enormous); through secondary
education; through conversation." Then in 1788 the public as a whole
was invited-by Necker-to make suggestions of remedies for the
great financial crisis of the government; the floodgates were opened,
and the cahiers de dolIances poured in-grievances of all kinds, proposals of all kinds. Now the circulation of ideas was extended beyond
the intellectuals to professional people generally, tradesmen, artisans,
indeed the entire middle class. Finally, King Louis XVI himself used
the magic phrase: "[Let us] raise the results of public opinion," he
said, "to the rank of laws, after they have submitted to ripe and profound examination. 'e
Eventually the Revolution institutionalized the concept that
government should be so organized as to require the maximum responsiveness to public opinion. The theoretical basis for such a political
principle may be found in the Enlightenment view that society is an
59. Id. at 75-76; HAMPSON, supra note 52, at 132-41.
60. Louis made this statement in 1788 as an invitation to the public to contribute to the initial stages of drafting a criminal code. "All our subjects," Louis declared,
"will be allowed to take part in the execution of the project [of the Criminal Code]
with which we are occupied .... Quoted in Paul Viollet, French Law in the Age of
the Revolution, in A.W. Ward et al., eds., THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, VIII, 744-45.

Cf.also E.J.

LOWELL, THE EVE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

324 (1892). Lowell states: "In

the decay of religious ideas, the Frenchmen of the eighteenth century had set up a
comparison independent of revelation. They had found it in public opinion. The sociable
population of Paris was ready to accept the common voice as arbiter. . . . 'A halberd
leads a kingdom,' cried a courtier to Quesnay the economist. 'And who leads the
halberd?' retorted the latter. 'Public opinion'."
On Rousseau's use of the phrase "public opinion" see Paul A. Palmer, The Con-

cept of Public Opinion in Political Theory, in ESSAYS IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL THEORY
235-37 (1936). Rousseau writes: "Just as the

IN HONOR OF CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN

declaration of the general will is made by the law, the declaration of public judgment
is made by the censorial tribunal. Public opinion is the sort of law of which the censor
is the minister." Cited in id. at 237. Palmer notes (233) that the phrase "opinio publica"
is found without the political connotation of public opinion in the writings of Marcus
Tullius Cicero, Ad. Atticum VI, i. 18 and in the writings of John of Salisbury, THE
STATESMAN'S BOOK OF JOHN OF SALISBURY, John Dickenson, ed., 39, 130 (1927). Earlier uses
of the term "opinion" in Pascal, Voltaire, Hobbes, and Locke carried a quite different
connotation (as did Rousseau's "general will"). See also Wilhelm Bauer, Public Opinion,
in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1934); B. FAy, NAISSANCE D'UN MONSTRE-L'OPINION PUBLIQUE (1965); H. Speier, The Rise of Public Opinion in Harold D. Lasswell et al.,
eds., PROPAGANDA AND COMMUNICATION IN WORLD HISTORY 147-67 (1980).
On the emergence of the modern meaning of "public opinion" in Necker's Circle, and the elaboration by him of a theory of government responsive to public opinion, see FERDINAND TONNIES, KRITIK DER OFFENTLICHEN MEINUNG Chap. VIII (1922).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol18/iss3/1

Berman: Law and Belief in Three Revolutions
LAW AND BELIEF

1984]

association of rational individuals; for if that is so, their shared opinions are the best indication of their needs. It was revolutionary experience, however, that brought this theory to fruition.
The element of nationalism was also more a product of the
Revolution itself than of the Enlightenment as such. Most of the intellectual leaders of the Enlightenment had thought of themselves as
Europeans. Rousseau, to be sure, had glorified the nation-state. He
had attributed to the nation total sovereignty, and to the state the
responsibility of inculcating in its citizens the redemptive virtues of
simplicity and honesty and care for the common good. Similarly, the
Abb6 de Sieyes, in his famous revolutionary tract The Third EstateWhat It Is, wrote that the nation exists before all and is the origin
of all; "its will is always legal, it is the law itself." These doctrines
are, indeed, as Jacob Talmon stressed, sources of twentieth century
totalitarian democracy."1 From an eighteenth century viewpoint,
however, the glorification of the nation-state was only an indirect
reflection of Enlightenment thought; more fundamentally, it was a product of the intense nationalism that was beginning to overcome Europe
as belief in traditional Christianity began to decline.2 But whatever
the underlying causes may have been, it was the Revolution itself
that put nationalism in the forefront of its belief system and of its
domestic and foreign policies. Domestically, the Revolutionary government sought to unify France politically, administratively, and legally,
as well as culturally. In foreign relations, the Revolutionary government mobilized a mass army to make war upon France's neighbors
in order to secure what she now conceived to be her "natural
boundaries."
The Transformation of French Law
As in the case of the German and English Revolutions, the most
apparent and most comprehensive legal changes connected with the
French Revolution were in the field of constitutional law. I have
already referred to many of these changes. A written constitution
was adopted for the first time in French history. A republican form

61. J. TALMON, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1952).
62. On the effect of the French Revolution on the rise of nationalism and
the new idea of the nation-state, see A. COBBAN, IN SEARCH OF HUMANITY: THE ROLE
OF ENLIGHTENMENT IN MODERN HISTORY 199 ff. ("The Rise of Nationalism") (1960); C. HAYES,
NATIONALISM:

A

RELIGION

43 ff. ("Making Nationalism a Religion in Revolutionary

France") (1962). The links between nationalism and public opinion are stressed by Cobban, as well as by C.B. ROGERS, THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTION IN 1789 (1949) 20 ff., 54 ff.,
206 ff. Rogers refers to revolutionary songs and rituals to show the religious character
of the belief in nationalism and in public opinion.
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of government was instituted, with supreme power given to a
legislative assembly elected by popular vote and responsive to public
opinion. The church was subjected to state control insofar as that was
necessary to protect religious toleration. The judiciary was confined
to the application of statutory law. Most hereditary distinctions and
social privileges of the aristocracy were abolished. Remnants of feudal
law were abolished. In principle, equal civil rights were established
for all.
In addition to constitutional law, other aspects of the French legal
system underwent transformation. Of special importance was the
unification of French law. Diversity of local customs, and especially
the striking differences in legal traditions between the south and the
north of France, were subordinated not only to a common written
constitution and a unified system of legislation and adjudication but
also to codification of criminal, civil, and commercial law on a national
scale.
In civil law, the famous Code civil of 1804, in whose drafting
Napoleon himself played a part, and which was intended to express
the spirit of the Revolution, gave especially strong protection to rights
of private property and contract. With the abolition of the remaining
feudal dues and restrictions, ownership was defined broadly as the
right to possess, use, and dispose of one's property as one wills, except
as prohibited by law. A general contract law was formulated -rules
applicable to all kinds of agreement; and the intention of the parties
was made central to contractual obligation. Rescission of contract for
gross unfairness ("lesion"), duress, or fraud, as well as for minority,
was now permitted by law without the former requirement of royal
consent. In tort law ("delict"), the principle was established that, as
a general rule, liability should be based on fault: the doer of harm
should not be civilly liable to the victim unless he intended to cause
the harm or else caused it negligently. In family law, the state was
accorded general jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. Marriage was
viewed as any other civil contract, and divorce was obtainable by
mutual consent, for cause, or for proven incompatibility. The father's
disciplinary power over his wife and his children was restricted. Wives
were accorded greater property rights and greater civil rights
3
generally.
63. See J.F. Traer, From Reform to Revolution: The Critical Century in the
Development of the French Legal System, 49 J. OF MOD. HIST. 73-88 (1977); id., MARRIAGE
AND THE FAMILY IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY FRANCE

(1980). For a general survey of French

Revolutionary private law legislation preceding the Code civil, see P. SAGNAC, LA
LEGISLATION CIVILE DE LA REVOLUTION FRANCAISE

at 710-53.
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Striking law reforms were also introduced in the field of criminal
law and procedure. Voltaire had not exaggerated when he wrote that
French criminal law and procedure of his time seemed to be "planned
to ruin citizens."64' Although the Criminal Ordinance of 1670 had identified types of crimes and the punishments applicable to them, in fact
public prosecutors and judges were free to indict and convict for acts
not legally defined as crimes at all; moreover, there was no control
over their actions, since proceedings were not public and no reports
of the reasons for decisions were given. Von Bar summarized the preRevolutionary situation as follows:
Punishments [were] unequal; they [varied] according to
the status of rank of the offenders rather than the nature
of the crime. Punishments [were] also cruel and barbarous
in their method-the base of the system [was] the death
penalty, and a prodigal use of bodily mutilations. Furthermore, punishments [were] variable in discretion; crimes
[were] loosely defined, and the individual [had] no security
against excess of severity in the state's repression of crime.
Finally, ignorance, prejudice, and emotional violence [bred]
imaginary crimes; and the scope of penal law [extended]
and trespasses even
beyond the regulation of social relations
5
upon the domain of conscience.1
The arbitrariness and cruelty of the substantive criminal law was
more than matched by that of the system of criminal procedure. I
have already mentioned the secrecy of it. In addition, suspects could
be held indefinitely in prison, incommunicado, while under
investigation -this under the notorious lettres de cachet. For capital
offenses, of which there were a very large number (including not only
treason and murder but also sacrilege, heresy, pandering, incest and
others), torture could be applied to secure a confession. The judges,
who had purchased their offices, were paid by the parties; additional
fees were extorted by delays, and bribery was a common practice.
The penal policy of the Revolution was expressed forcefully in
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of August 1789.
Among its provisions were the following:
-The law may inflict only such penalties as are strictly and
clearly necessary.
-Retroactive

64.
65.

laws are proscribed.

Quoted in L. RADZINOWICZ, IDEOLOGY AND CRIME 1 (1966).
LUDWIG VON BAR, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CRIMINAL LAW 315
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-Like offenses are to receive like punishments, regardless of
the rank and station of the offender.
-The death penalty or infamous punishment cannot carry a
vicarious infamy to the family of the condemned person.
-General

confiscation of the property of a condemned person

is abolished.
-A

criminal action against a party dies when the party dies.

-There shall be no crime, no punishment, without a [previously
enacted] law.
- There shall be a presumption of innocence.
In 1791 the fledgling Republic issues a comprehensive Penal Code.
Characteristically, it was meticulous in its efforts to define crimes
and to fix the severity of the punishments in proportion to the gravity
of the crime. It aimed to curtail judicial discretion severely and to
provide a predictable, graduated penalty structure. The 1791 Penal
Code was revised in 1795. Ultimately it was replaced in 1810. The
1810 Code has served as the basic penal legislation in France-of
course, with numerous amendments -until the present.
The 1810 Penal Code-like the 1804 Civil Code-bears the stamp
of Napoleon's own ideas. Napoleon was in close touch with the five
draftsmen of his Penal Code and with the Council of State which was
responsible for accepting or rejecting it.
Napoleon's guiding principle, and that of his draftsmen, was
general deterrence of crime, which he believed that the law could
foster by intimidation, that is, by threat of penalty. Retribution was
rejected, whether in the classical sense of exaction of a price for violation of the law (which I would call general retribution) or in the sense
of vengeance (which I would call special retribution). The emphasis
on deterrence was characteristic of the utilitarian philosophy which
prevailed in the Enlightenment and was embodied in the Revolution.
Criminal acts were to be punished because they were socially
harmful-not because they violated the divine order or the cosmic
order, not because they were morally wrong, not because they were
against the traditions of the people. The punishment was to be primarily a deterrent to others. The goal of rehabilitation of the offender
is, of course, consistent with utilitarianism and was reflected in the
1791 Code. In the 1810 Code, however, Napoleon opted for general
deterrence, and against rehabilitation, as a guiding principle. "Prisons,"
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said Napoleon, "are to punish prisoners, not to reform them.""s This
was also consistent with utilitarianism, and with Beccaria's view that
it is not a proper function of the law to enforce moral virtues.
In addition, Napoleon supported the reintroduction of branding
for forgery, which the 1791 Code had eliminated. Confiscation of property was also reintroduced. Life imprisonment was ruled out, but not
penal servitude for life. Only limited judicial discretion to move between minimum and maximum penalties was favored. There were
other shifts in emphasis between 1791 and 1810, but the basic philosophy was the same: for Napoleon and his draftsmen, as for the draftsmen of 1791, as for Beccaria and the philosophes in the generation
after 1750, the criminal law was to be, above all, a rational instrument of the state, intended by its nature to deter potential criminals
by threat of penalties. Of Luther's first two uses of the law-the
political and the theological-only the first was kept; the third use,
the educational (to guide the faithful to virtue), stressed by Calvinism,
was also discarded ("Prisons are to punish prisoners, not to reform
them").
I have touched
followed in the wake
such changes I shall
itself, and especially
of legislation.

on a few basic changes in French law that
of the French Revolution. Among many other
mention only one: the change in legal science
in the style and method of legal analysis and

Prior to the Revolution, legal science in France was highly
developed in the Roman Catholic Church, where it was applied to
canon law and to the texts of Roman law that formed one of the
sources of canon law, and in the universities, where it was also applied chiefly to canon law and Roman law. French secular law-royal
law, customary law, the law of the cities and provinces-had become
a university subject in 1697, but prior to the Revolution it remained
a stepchild in the curriculum. This was due in part to the extraordinary diversity and complexity of French customary and local law,
and in part to the largely unsystematized character of French royal
law. Decisions of royal courts were seldom published; indeed, they
were, for the most part, secret; and French royal statutes and regulations, though increasingly numerous in the eighteenth century, were
for the most part not collected or harmonized. Portalis, a principal

66. Quoted in H.A.L.
BRIDGE MODERN HISTORY, IX,

FISHER, "THE CODES," in A.W. WARD et al., eds., THE CAM175 (1906). Cf. von Bar, supra note 65 at 335, n. 7.
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author of the 1804 Code civil, described the predicament of the
codifiers as they considered the pre-existing laws. "What a spectacle
opened before our eyes!" he wrote. "Facing us was a confused and
shapeless mass of foreign and French laws, of general and particular
customs, of abrogated and unabrogated ordinances, of contradictory
regulations and conflicting decisions; one encountered nothing but a
mysterious labyrinth."67
Under these circumstances the draftsmen of the civil code seized
upon the few available treatises. Of these, the most important was
that of Pothier (1699-1772), former judge at Orl6ans, professor of
French law at the University of Orl6ans after 1750, and prolific writer
on civil law and family law. In criminal law as well, the codifiers drew
heavily upon leading scholarly writings. Thus in France in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as in Germany three centuries earlier, a professorial style of systematization was introduced
both into legal analysis and into legislation (though not into French
judicial opinions, which, under the influence of the doctrine of absolute
legislative supremacy, became more laconic than ever).
French professorial style differed, however, from its German
counterpart. Far more than the Germans, the French jurists prized
simplicity and clarity and strove to avoid both casuistry and the excessive qualification of general doctrines. These characteristics of the
new French legal science linked it with post-Revolutionary French
thought and with French letters generally. Stendhal's famous remark
is revealing in this regard -that he kept the Code civil at his bedside
for evening reading, pour prendre le ton.
Law AND Belief in the French Revolution
That both the French legal system and the French belief system
underwent substantial transformations in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth century can
hardly be doubted. Moreover, important connections between the two
transformations are easily discernible. In this respect the French
Revolution differed markedly from its predecessors, the English and
the German. As we have seen, it is not obvious-although it is truethat the nature and substance of German law reform in the sixteenth
century are traceable in part to Lutheran beliefs and concepts. Similarly, it is not obvious-although it is true-that basic changes in English
law in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries are
67. Fenet Recueil complet des travaux pr6paratoires du Code civil xciii (1836),
cited in ARTHUR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 12 (1957). See also DAWSON, supra
note 10 at 314-49.
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traceable in part to Puritan beliefs and concepts. In the case of these
earlier revolutions, the connections between political and legal changes,
on the one hand, and changes in the belief system, on the other, are
more hidden, partly because the changes in the belief system were
expressed primarily in new theologies rather than in new secular
philosophies. The secular philosophies of Lutheranism and Calvinism
were for the most part implicit rather than explicit. In the French
Revolution, on the other hand, the secular philosophies were largely
explicit; indeed, it was the theology of the Revolution that was largely
implicit. Eventually, the law reforms that took place in France in the
decades after 1789 were a conscious reflection of secular philosophies
associated with the Revolution-its outlook of rationalism, individualism, and utilitarianism, and its emphasis on equality of opportunity, natural rights, freedom of expression, and freedom of will. In
many instances the law reforms introduced after the Revolution were
those that had previously been demanded by the opinion leaders of
the - Enlightenment; for example, in the 1750s, 1760s, and 1770s
Voltaire, Beccaria, and hundreds of others who called themselves
philosophes demanded the reform of French criminal law and procedure, and in the period after 1789 their demands were largely fulfilled by new legislation. Thus it has been said that the criminal law
reform in the post-1789 period is "one of the clearest 'success stories'
of the philosophes.''
In speaking of the secular outlook of the Enlightenment and of
the embodiment of that outlook in the law reforms that followed the
French Revolution, one cannot ignore the fact that that secular outlook
was itself derived from certain religious beliefs. I have spoken earlier
of the belief in Deism. That was, of course, an explicit theology. It
postulated a God of creation, who appointed a purpose for everything
in the universe. Man was given certain qualities-above all, reason-to
enable him to secure his own advancement. By using his reason Man
is able-so the philosophes taught-to cast out error, to discern truth,
and to reform the world.
From Deism it followed-and here we move from explicit to implicit theology-that Man is essentially good, not evil. He is born free
and equal. He is born with the capacity to pursue-and to achieveboth knowledge and happiness. His future is governed by a natural
law of progress. Thus arose what has been called "a new cosmology,"
namely, "the belief that all human beings can attain here on this earth
a share of perfection hitherto in the West thought to be possible only
68.
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69
for Christians in a state of grace and for them only after death."

Not only Protestant Christianity in its Lutheran and Calvinist
forms but also Roman Catholic and Anglican Christianity were
challenged by this new implicit theology. Faith in the natural goodness
of man, in the purity and power of reason, in the promise of science,
and in the inevitability of progress -challenged the old belief in Scripture and tradition, in the sinfulness of man, in the providential
character of human history, and in the power of grace and revelation.
Standing between the secular outlook (rationalism, individualism,
utilitarianism, natural rights, equality of opportunity, freedom of expression, freedom of will) on the one hand, and the implicit theology
(Deist creationism, the perfectability of man, the natural law of progress) on the other hand were the twin dogmas of the nation-state
and of public opinion. Law was to be the law of the nation-state as
determined by public opinion. Its ultimate justification was to bring
about progress and perfect happiness, and thus to fulfill the purpose
by responding
of creation, but it was to do so, in the first instance,
70
to the national interest democratically expressed.
Yet it would be wrong to say that the philosophy and theology
of the eighteenth century Enlightenment and of the French Revolution marked a total break with the philosophy and theology of the
English and German Revolutions or of Western Christendom in the
Roman Catholic era of the eleventh to fifteenth centuries. The answers
were different, but the basic questions and the terms of reference
were the same.
Similarly, it would be wrong to suppose that the changes in
French law that took place in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries lacked continuity with prerevolutionary law. Like the reformed German law of the sixteenth century and the reformed English
law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so the reformed

69. CRANE BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN: THE STORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT 369 (1950).
The novelty of this conception was expressed by St. Just: "Le bonheur est une idde
nueve en Europe." Id.
70. The origin of the ideas of natural progress and of human perfectibility
in eighteenth century Deism, and their relationship to public opinion and democracy,
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French law of the nineteenth century had its roots in an older European legal tradition that dated from the late eleventh and twelfth
centuries. Each of the Great Revolutions of modern Western history
represented both a break with that tradition and a renewal of it.
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